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Introduction
Criminal conviction in the United States requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. This proposition is not merely descriptive. It also
states a fundamental normative precept of the Anglo-American con-
ception of justice. As such, the reasonable-doubt standard has been
accepted as constitutional command and thus secured against legisla-
tive abandonment.
While the validity of this principle is not much doubted, its im-
plementation has spawned controversy. In particular, the courts have
been troubled by recent challenges to the constitutionality of defenses
and presumptions in the criminal law. Defenses, or at least some of
them, shift to the accused the burden of establishing exculpatory facts.
Presumptions allow the prosecution to make out its case by means of
evidence less persuasive than might otherwise be required under the
reasonable-doubt standard. Both of these devices are established fea-
tures of the penal law, yet both are arguably inconsistent with the
constitutional commitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
This article suggests a framework for determining the constitution-
ality of defenses and presumptions in the criminal law. We reject the
view that would limit the reasonable-doubt requirement to those facts
formally identified as elements of the offense charged. We also reject
the approach that would condemn every exception to the reasonable-
doubt standard as constitutionally impermissible. Instead, we propose
a rule that would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a con-
stitutionally adequate basis for imposing the punishment authorized.
This proposal posits a relationship between the standard of proof and
the substance of the penal law. In our view, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is a procedural standard designed to protect the innocent. In-
nocence, however, is not a procedural concept. Its meaning under law
derives from the exercise of legislative authority over the definiti6n of
criminal conduct. A constitutional rule governing procedural alloca-
tion of the burden of proof, therefore, should take account of the sub-
stantive content of crime definition as well as the degree of certainty
with which specified facts are established. In other words, the constitu-
tional guarantee of proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be
premised in part on a constitutional conception of what must be
proved.
Part I of this article criticizes efforts to treat the constitutional com-
mitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a purely procedural
issue, unrelated to the substance of the penal law. Part II describes the
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evolution of judicial opinion toward a more substantive conception of
the meaning of the reasonable-doubt requirement and criticizes as insuf-
ficient two suggested interpretations that move in that direction. Part
III outlines an approach that relates the constitutional requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to an assessment of a constitutionally
adequate basis for punishment.
I. Burden of Proof as an Exclusively Procedural Concern
A. The Constitutionalization of Burden of Proof and
the Inadequacies of Formalism
The constitutionalization of burden of proof began with In re Win-
ship.1 That case involved a New York statute permitting adjudication
of juvenile delinquency based on a preponderance of the evidence.
The challenge to that scheme raised two related issues: whether proof
beyond a reasonable doubt was essential for criminal conviction; and,
if so, whether that standard was also required in delinquency proceed-
ings. The Court answered both questions in the affirmative and an-
nounced the constitutionalization of burden of proof: "Lest there re-
main any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the-Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."
'2
On its face, this pronouncement was scarcely revolutionary. By the
time of Winship, no American jurisdiction authorized conviction of an
adult based on anything less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As
a general rule of criminal procedure, therefore, Winship merely con-
firmed the status quo, and the application of its requirement in most
cases seemed to pose no particular problem. Absent from the Winship
opinion, however, was any discussion of the scope of the constitutional
commitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt: What, exactly, was
included by the phrase "every fact necessary to constitute the crime...
charged?"
On a purely formal level, the answer may seem obvious. A fact may
be deemed "necessary to constitute the crime ... charged" if it is an
element of the offense, that is, if it is one of the components of actus
reus or mens rea needed to establish liability under a penal statute.
Not every fact relevant to outcome would meet this test. A fact showing
1. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2. Id. at 364.
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excuse or justification might be determinative of guilt or innocence,
but it is still extrinsic to the definition of the crime and hence removed
from the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Because this reading of Winship confines its scope to matters
formally incorporated in the definition of crime by statute or judicial
interpretation, it will be referred to as the "formal" interpretation of
that decision. 3
At first blush, the formal reading of Winship has much to recom-
mend it. It is not only consistent with the language of the decision, but
also in accord with the traditional assumption of a generic difference
between the definition of crime and the recoguition of defenses. 4
Moreover, the limitation of Winship to those matters formally identi-
fied as elements of a crime finds confirmation in familiar patterns of
state law regarding burden of proof. Except in the arguably special
case of presumptions,5 no state has ever required an adult defendant
to disprove a "fact necessary to constitute the crime ...charged. '"
According to the formal interpretation, therefore, Winship would
have little practical consequence beyond the context of juvenile pro-
ceedings.7
If Winship were read to extend the reasonable-doubt requirement to
defenses, its impact on existing law would be substantial. Most Ameri-
can jurisdictions have placed on the accused the burdens of production
and persuasion8 for one or more of the recognized defenses to criminal
3. In the discussion that follows, we state our reasons for rejecting the formal in-
terpretation of Winship. Professor Allen calls this interpretation the "elements test" and
reaches the same conclusions as to its validity. See Allen, The Restoration of In re
Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases After Patterson v.
New York, 76 MicH. L. REv. 30, 49-50 (1977).
4. See generally Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-
of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 883-86 (1968).
5. See pp. 1535-37 infra.
6. Sometimes, however, an element of an offense and a defense to liability may cover
the same ground. For example, proof of insanity may be considered to negate the mens
rea required by the definition of an offense. For those jurisdictions that place the burden
of proof on the accused for the issue of insanity, see note 9 infra, the effect may be to
require that the defendant disprove an element of the offense charged when the reason
for doubting its existence depends on evidence of mental disease or defect.
7. It may be argued, however, that Winship should have influence beyond the criminal
law. Principles of due process may demand its extension to certain kinds of civil pro-
ceedings, such as immigration and citizenship determinations. See Terrazas v. Vance, 577
F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 439 U.S. 1532 (1979) (No. 78-1143). But see Addington
v. Texas, 47 U.S.L.W. 4473 (1979) (mental hospital commitment proceedings require only
clear and convincing proof). These problems are outside the scope of this article.
8. The burden of production refers to the obligation to raise an issue. The burden of
persuasion refers to the risk of uncertainty as to the issue's resolution. Thus, the party
bearing the burden of production will have an issue resolved against him if it is not
raised by the evidence. The party bearing the burden of persuasion will have an issue
resolved against him if, after all the evidence is considered, the trier of fact remains un-
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liability. Many states require the defendant to prove insanity. Various
jurisdictions have also shifted the burden of proof for self-defense,",
certain on the point. The degree of certainty required is determined by the standard of
proof-e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence. See F.
JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 7.5-.7 (1965); J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE
AT THE COMMON LAW 355-59 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2485-2588 (3d ed. 1940 g:
Supp. 1977); McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden
of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. REv. 1382 (1955).
The burdens of production and persuasion may or may not be assigned to the same
party. Unfortunately, that fact is sometimes obscured by indiscriminate use of the term
"burden of proof" to refer to either or both kinds of burdens. Professor Fletcher has
argued that this imprecision of terminology has led some courts to assign the burden
of persuasion to criminal defendants merely because the rules of pleading required the
defendant to raise the question for consideration. Fletcher, supra note 4, at 902-10.
In this article, the phrase "burden of proof" is used to refer to both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion. When we mean to refer to only one type of
burden, we shall say which one.
9. This requirement is included in some state statutes. See KY. REV. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
504.020 (1975 & Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.055(2), .305 (1977); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 1, § 2.04(d), tit. 2, §§ 8.01(a), (d) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1978-79); WAsh. REV.
CODE § 9A.12.090(2) (1977).
It has also been required by many courts. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952);
Bell v. State, 120 Ark. 530, 180 SAV. 186 (1915); People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268
P.2d 705 (1954); Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del.), appeal dismissed for want of sub-
stantial federal question, 429 U.S. 877 (1976); Shanahan v. United States, 354 A.2d 524
(D.C. 1976); Grace v. Hopper, 234 Ca. 669, 217 S.E.2d 267 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1066 (1976); State v. Booth, 169 N.W.2d 869 (Iowa 1969); State v. Daigle, 334 So. 2d 1380
(La. 1977); State v. Melvin, 341 A.2d 376 (Me. 1975); State v. Holmes, 439 S.W.2d 518
(Mo. 1969); State v. Caryl, 168 Mont. 414, 543 P.2d 389 (1975); Guynes v. State, 92 Nev.
693, 558 P.2d 626 (1976); State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47, 335 A.2d 12 (1975); State v. Harris, 290
N.C. 718, 228 S.E.2d 424 (1976); State v. Jackson, 32 Ohio St. 2d 203, 291 N.E.2d 432
(1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); State v. Page, 104 R.I. 323, 244 A.2d 258
(1968); State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E.2d 548 (1970); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208
Va. 316, 157 S.E.2d 185 (1967); State v. Canaday, 79 Wash. 2d 647, 488 P.2d 1064 (1971),
vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 940 (1972); State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va.
1976); State v. Bergenthal, 47 Wis. 2d 668, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970). See generally Note,
Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the Defendant
in Murder Cases, 56 B.U. L. REv. 499 (1976). In federal cases, the defendant bears the
burden of production but not persuasion on the insanity issue. Davis v. United States,
160 U.S. 469 (1895).
10. At one time or another, many jurisdictions have placed on the defendant the
burden of proving self-defense to a charge of criminal homicide. See Quillen v. State, 49
Del. 114, 121, 110 A.2d 445, 449 (1955); Richie v. Commonwealth, 242 S.W.2d 1000, 1004
(Ky. 1951); DeVaughn v State, 232 Md. 447, 453, 194 A.2d 109, 112 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 927 (1964); State v. Skinner, 32 Nev. 70, 74, 104 P. 223, 224 (1909); State v. Jennings,
276 N.C. 157, 160, 171 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1970); State v. Farley, 112 Ohio App. 448, 451-52, 176
N.E.2d 232, 234 (1960), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St. 483, 172 N.E.2d 298 (1961); Com-
monwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 249-50, 199 A.2d 411, 413, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939
(1964); People v. Gonzilez, 69 P.R.R. 533, 535 (P.R. Dist. Ct. 1949); State v. Mellow, 107
A. 871 (R.I. 1919); State v. Osborne, 202 S.C. 473, 478-79, 25 S.E.2d 561, 563, cert. denied,
320 U.S. 763 (1943); Keith v. State, 218 Tenn. 395, 400, 403 S.W.2d 758, 760 (1966); State v.
Turpin, 158 Wash. 103, 110-11, 290 P. 824, 826 (1930); State v. Zannino, 129 W. Va. 775,
780-81, 41 S.E.2d 641, 644 (1947).
Others place the burden of proving that the defendant did not act in self-defense on
the state. See, e.g., Bange v. State, 237 Ind. 422, 426, 146 N.E.2d 811, 813 (1958); State V.
Badgett, 167 NAV.2d 680, 683 (Iowa 1969); State v. Archbold, 178 Neb. 433, 436, 133
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duress,1 and many other specifications of justification or excuse.12 To
read Winship as applicable to those issues would raise a substantial
challenge to the validity of much of the existing law of defenses. Con-
fining Winship to the elements of crime, in contrast, brings the case
into general conformity with current practice and avoids the prospect
of wholesale invalidation of existing law. For these and perhaps for
other reasons as well, Winship has been taken uncritically to apply
only to those aspects of the substantive law that are formally incorpo-
rated in the definition of a criminal offense. This restrictive reading of
the case is grounded in, and dependent on, the traditional assumption
of some generic difference between the facts necessary to constitute a
crime and those needed to establish a defense to, or mitigation of,
liability.
The trouble, of course, is that the distinction is essentially arbitrary.
N.W.2d 601, 603 (1965). Some states have recently removed the burden of proof from the
defendant in general recodifications of their criminal laws. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State,
343 A.2d 594 (Del. 1975) (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304, 464 (1974 & Supp.
1978)); Commonwealth v. Cropper, 463 Pa. 529, 345 A.2d 645 (1975) (interpreting 18 PA.
CONS. STiT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon 1973)).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 950 (1973); Roy v. Commonwealth, 500 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1973); People v. Calvano, 30
N.Y.2d 199, 282 N.E.2d 322, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1972); State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio St. 63,
95 N.E. 381 (1911); 9 J. WmioRE, supra note 8, § 2512.
12. At one time or another, several states have required that the defendant bear the
burden of proving that a homicide was accidental. See, e.g., Pixley v. State, 203 Ark. 42,
155 S.W.2d 710 (1941); Chandle v. State, 230 Ga. 574, 198 S.E.2d 289 (1973); State v.
Deane, 75 Idaho 149, 268 P.2d 1114 (1954); People v. Slaughter, 29 I1. 2d 384, 194
N.E.2d 193 (1963); Partin v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. 1969); State v. Enlow,
536 S.W.2d 533 (Mo. App. 1976); State v. Bonds, 2 Nev. 265 (1866).
Several cases hold that the defendant bears some part of the burden of proving entrap-
ment, see United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1064
(1972); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963);
Averett v. State, 246 Miss. 49, 149 So. 2d 320, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 5 (1963); State v. Parr,
129 Mont. 175, 283 P.2d 1086 (1955); State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 197 A.2d 185 (1964);
State v. Good, 110 Ohio App. 415, 165 N.E.2d 28 (1960).
When an element of the crime charged is the formation of a specific intent, several
states have imposed on the defendant the burden of proving that intoxication prevented
the formation of such intent. See State v. Linzmeyer, 248 Iowa 31, 79 N.W.2d 206 (1959);
State v. Quigley, 135 Me. 435, 199 A. 269 (1938); State v. Kelly, 216 N.C. 627, 6 S.E.2d 533
(1940); State v. Tune, 17 N.J. 100, 110 A.2d 99 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 907 (1955);
State v. French, 171 Ohio St. 501, 172 N.E.2d 613, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 973 (1961).
Jurisdictions recognizing a mistake of fact as to marriage or an honest belief that a
marriage was dissolved as a defense to bigamy usually require the defendant to bear the
burden of proving the defense. See, e.g., State v. Cain, 106 La. 708, 31 So. 300 (1902); Coy
v. State, 171 S.W. 221 (Tex. Grim. App. 1914).
A good faith belief that the prosecutrix had reached the age of consent has recently
been accepted as a defense to statutory rape in a few jurisdictions. Allocation of the
burden of proof of this defense appears to vary. ComPare People v. Battles, 240 Cal. App.
2d 122, 49 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1966) (burden on defendant to prove good faith belief to
satisfaction of court) with State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978) (upholding instruction
placing burden on prosecution) and People v. Winters, 242 Cal. App. 2d 711, 51 Cal. Rptr.
735 (1966) (burden on prosecution).
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"Crimes" and "defenses" both set forth substantive conditions of
liability. The issues raised in both categories of doctrine must be
resolved against the defendant in order to convict. A legislative decision
to treat a particular matter as an element of an offense or as a defense
to liability may depend simply on convenience or ease in phrasing.
Thus, there is no substantive difference between a penal code that
states the doctrines of murder and self-defense in separate provisions
and one that redefines murder as the killing of a human being done
with malice aforethought and not in self-defense. There are, to be sure,
issues of statutory economy at stake. Self-defense applies to many crimes
other than murder, and no doubt it is easier to state the doctrine
separately than to repeat it for each of the various homicide and assault
offenses. But this matter of convenience does not itself furnish any
functional basis for distinguishing the applicability of a constitutional
doctrine regarding burden of proof.
Traditionally, the only functional difference between a "crime" and
a "defense" has been precisely the issue under consideration-allocation
of the burden of proof. The essential consequence of labeling an issue
as a defense rather than as an element of the crime is that consideration
of the issue is precluded unless the matter is raised by competent
evidence. In other words, a defense places the risk of nonproduc-
tion on the defendant.' 3 Some defenses may also require the de-
fendant to carry the burden of persuasion, that is, to bear the risk
of failing to convince the trier of fact, usually by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the specified exculpation does exist. For an issue
designated an element of the crime, by contrast, both the burdens of
production and persuasion ordinarily remain on the prosecution. This
is a nonformal difference between a "crime" and a "defense," and it
leads to a point of some difficulty in the application of Winship. Win-
ship purported to fix the burden of proof as a matter of constitutional
law. To make the scope of that doctrine depend on the legislative
allocation of the burden of proof is to assume the point in issue and
thus to reduce Winship to a circularity.
In short, "crime" and "defense" are substantively equivalent, if not
procedurally identical. Whether a particular factor is part of one or
the other cannot be derived from principle or logic. The original
13. Assignment of the burden of production to the defendant is assumed to be im-
plicit in the designation of an issue as a defense. See, e.g., W. LAFAvE & A. Scoxrr,
CRIMINAL LAW 269 (1972) (footnote omitted :,nd emphasis added):
There exist in the criminal law a number of substantive defenses to a charge of
criminal conduct. These defenses are usually defined in terms of unusual circum-
stances which, when raised by the defendant, evidence a situation in which the
purposes of the penal law would not be served by conviction of the defendant.
1332
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reasons for regarding insanity as a defense but malice as an element of
murder are obscured by the passage of time. Today, that distinction is
perpetuated by habit and convenience. There is no reason in policy
to limit Winship to essentially formal distinctions among the facts
relevant to criminal liability. Indeed, there is good reason to try to
make more of the decision, for it is a singularly shallow constitutional
principle that is subject to defeat by a single stroke of the drafter's
pen.
Once one recognizes the substantive interchangeability of "crimes"
and "defenses," the pronouncement of Winship takes on an entirely
different cast. It no longer seems clear that the reasonable-doubt re-
quirement should be limited to those facts formally identified as ele-
ments of an offense. In fact, it becomes at least plausible to read the
Court's reference to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime...
charged" as embracing any of a number of nonformal standards for
determining the scope of Winship.
B. The Procedural Interpretation of In re Winship
To date, interest has focused on what we shall call the procedural
interpretation of Winship. That interpretation would read "every fact
necessary to constitute the crime ... charged" to mean every fact that
might be determinative of penal liability. It would require the prosecu-
tion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not only the presence of every
element of the offense but also the absence of justification, excuse, or
other grounds of exculpation or mitigation. In other words, the state
bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every fact
regarded by statute as relevant to the imposition of penal liability.
Read this way, Winship did not affirm the status quo. Instead, it
launched a sweeping, though probably unintended, attack on the con-
stitutionality of many familiar aspects of the criminal law. This is
referred to as the "procedural" interpretation of Winship because it
emphasizes proof beyond a reasonable doubt as a procedural standard
to be enforced without regard to the substantive content of the penal
law.
In its broadest reach, a purely procedural insistence on proof beyond
a reasonable doubt might lead to the invalidation of every "defense"
to criminal liability. All defenses shift at least the burden of produc-
tion to the accused. If neither the defendant nor the government
provides evidence suggesting self-defense, for example, the issue is
resolved in favor of the state, and no instruction on the point is given
to the jury. As a result, the prosecution is relieved of the duty, imposed
1333
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by the procedural interpretation of Winship, to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every fact essential to criminal liability.
Theoretical inconsistency notwithstanding, placing the burden of
production on the defendant has not been thought to raise any prac-
tical challenge to the reasonable-doubt standard. A shift in the burden
of production, when not accompanied by a shift in the burden of
persuasion, has little, if any, impact on the substantive relation between
the state and the criminal accused. Instead, placing the burden of
production on the defendant is an economical way to screen out issues
extraneous to the case at hand and thus to promote efficient litigation.
Moreover, the apparent theoretical inconsistency disappears if one
assumes that the prosecution could prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of any exculpatory fact for which the defendant could
produce no affirmative evidence.14 Accordingly, there appears to be a
consensus that shifting the burden of production is a permissible house-
keeping device and not a true exception to the procedural interpreta-
tion of Winship.15
Some defenses, however, shift to the defendant both the burdens of
production and persuasion. In such a case, the accused must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the asserted exculpation does exist.
As to that issue, he bears the risk of nonpersuasion; the jury is in-
structed to resolve uncertainty against him.16 This kind of burden-
14. In Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701 n.28 (1975), for example, the Supreme
Court expressly noted that nothing in that decision was intended to affect the traditional
requirement that the defendant bear the burden of production by showing "some
evidence" of provocation. See State v. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977).
Other authorities have suggested, however, that there may be "outer limits" on the
authority of the state to shift the burden of production to the defendant. E.g., Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 230 n.16 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); see Ashford &
Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical
Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 186-93 (1969); Comment, Unburdening the Criminal De-
fendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 390, 420-24 (1976). To date, Ao court has held unconstitutional a defense that shifted
only the burden of production.
15. See, e.g., Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1335-36 (1977).
Mr. Justice Black held the view that a shift in the burden of production infringed a
defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by coercing him to
take the witness stand in his own behalf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432-33
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87-88 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting). The Court consistently has rejected this position, and has perceived such
a burden as no different in kind from the introduction of direct evidence that demands
some kind of rebuttal. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846-47 (1973); Turner v.
United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417-18 (1970); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185
(1925).
16. An alternative formulation is that the accused must prove the issue "to the
satisfaction of the jury." See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 169. In very rare
instances, the defendant has been required to prove an issue beyond a reasonable doubt.
E.g., Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (insanity).
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shifting device is often, though not uniformly, called an "affirmative
defense."' 7 It does far more than screen out extraneous issues; it helps
to determine the relationship between the state and the accused by
defining the conditions for imposition of criminal liability. By altering
the rule of decision for resolving close questions, shifting the burden
of persuasion should produce convictions in some cases where acquittal
would have resulted if the prosecution had been required to disprove
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of exculpatory facts. Indeed,
the explicit justification for shifting the burden of persuasion to the
defendant is often to ease the prosecutor's difficulty in disproving facts
peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge. The use of an affirmative
defense, therefore, is inconsistent with the procedural reading of Win-
ship that requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
relevant to the imposition of penal liability.
Moreover, a procedural interpretation of Winship also undercuts the
use of presumptions in the criminal law. Through presumptions, the
existence of one fact is presumed from proof of another. Unfortunately,
this description covers a range of procedural effects, and the language
used to differentiate among them is, in the phrase of one authority,
"exasperatingly indiscriminate."'I s The "true" presumption creates an
inference that is mandatory unless rebutted.' 9 Thus the law might
declare that fact X must be presumed from fact Y unless the opposing
party produces sufficient rebuttal evidence to show that fact X did
not exist.2 0 Although some penal statutes purport to create presump-
tions in mandatory terms,2' they are generally not given compulsory
17. The use of the term "affirmative defense" to identify an issue for which the de-
fendant bears the burdens of production and persuasion is a feature of many modern
statutes. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(1) (1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1980); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-12(b) (1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-907 (1978).
The usage is also followed in the proposed federal criminal code as passed by the
Senate. S. 1437, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1978). A different meaning is attached to the
term "affirmative defense" by the Model Penal Code. There, the term is used to identify
an issue for which the defendant bears the burden of production but for which the
prosecution retains the burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 1.12(2), (3) (Proposed Official Draft (P.O.D.) 1962).
18. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUcTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 49 (1978).
19. See E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31-37 (1963). Ashford and Risinger
evidently mean to incorporate this type of presumption in their definition of an "assump-
tion." Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 173-74. Their terminology apparently
derives from 0. FISK, THE LAW OF PROOF IN JUDICIAL PROCEDURES (1928).
20. For example, some jury instructions state that a presumption "shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains [the contrary
fact] to the satisfaction of the jury." United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 nA
(1965) (in effect shifting burden of persuasion on that issue to defendant). Others have
the effect of shifting only the burden of production. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5)
(P.O.D. 1962); cf. J. THAYER, supra note 8, at 337-39 (error to confuse presumptions with
actual evidence).
21. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5601(b) (1976).
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effect.22 Instead, the term "presumption" is used in the criminal law
to describe what might better be termed a permissible inference. The
law might authorize the trier of fact to infer fact X, an element of the
crime charged, from proof of act Y. Under this scheme, evidence of Y
would allow the prosecution to put its case to the jury and to avoid a
directed verdict of acquittal based on failure to prove X beyond a
reasonable doubt.23
The effect of this kind of rule is difficult to assess in the abstract. It
depends on how closely facts X and Y are related by experience and
common sense. If X and Y are closely linked, then the presumption of
one from the other may simply restate the obvious. If, however, the
two facts are sufficiently unrelated that proof of Y would not ordinarily
be regarded as sufficient evidence of X, the presumption allows the
jury to convict on the basis of otherwise inadequate evidence.
Even a nonmandatory presumption is plainly inconsistent with a
rigorously procedural interpretation of Winship. Allowing the jury to
find one fact upon proof of another relieves the prosecution of the
obligation to establish the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
To the extent that the relationship between the proved and presumed
facts falls short of near certainty, the presumption of one from the
other, like an affirmative defense, constitutes an exception to the
reasonable-doubt standard. In this respect, a presumption is function-
ally equivalent to an affirmative defense.
Unlike affirmative defenses, however, presumptions have long been
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Even before Winship, presumptions
were attacked on constitutional grounds, and various rules were de-
vised to determine whether a particular presumption comported with
due process. Early cases looked for a "rational connection" between
the proved and presumed facts. 24 Other decisions asked whether it
would be more convenient for the government or accused to adduce
direct evidence of the presumed facts.205 Still another test was ad-
vanced by Mr. Justice Holmes in Ferry v. Ramsey.20 There the Court
22. See generally G. LILLY, supra note 18, at 50-52 (citing sources).
23. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(5) (P.O.D. 1962). Under the Code, the device
has two consequences. First, it allows the prosecution to satisfy the burden of production
as to the presumed fact by introducing evidence of the fact giving rise to the presump-
tion. Additionally, the Model Code authorizes an instruction to the effect that, although
the presumed fact must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may regard proof
of the fact giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
24. See, e.g., Western & A.R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 644 (1929); McFarland v.
American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916); Mobile, J. & K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed,
219 U.S. 35, 43 (1910).
25. See, e.g., Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1932).
26. 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (presumption of director's knowledge of insolvency of bank upon
proof of bank's insolvency).
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permitted a presumption whenever the state could have based liability
on the facts that had to be proved in order to trigger the presumption.
This standard, sometimes called the "greater-includes-the-lesser" rule,
focused on the substantive content of what the state had to prove and
ignored the procedural embellishments with which those requirements
were stated.27 The state's power to abolish X as an element of a given
offense was thought to include a lesser power to presume the existence
of X upon proof of Y. Under this reasoning, a defendant had no cause
for complaint when he was required to rebut a fact presumed against
him as long as the state had the authority to make the presumed fact
altogether irrelevant to guilt or innocence.
More recent cases have rejected the "greater-includes-the-lesser"
rule.28 In Tot v. United States,29 the Court returned to the "rational
connection" test, which requires the existence of a "rational connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed." 30 In Leary
v. United States,31 the Court added the gloss that a presumption is to
be deemed "'irrational' or 'arbitrary,' and hence unconstitutional, un-
less it can be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is
more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made
to depend."132 Indeed, recent decisions suggest a movement toward
requiring that the presumed fact follow from the proved fact beyond
a reasonable doubt, although no case has expressly so held.33 The effect
of this rule would be to restrict presumptions to inferences of such
certainty as to rob the device of any practical consequence and thus to
eliminate it as a meaningful feature of the definition of crimes.
Under a procedural interpretation of In re Winship, therefore, af-
firmative defenses and presumptions are equivalent. A formal inter-
27. As Justice Holmes put the point: "The statute in short imposed a liability that was
less than might have been imposed, and that being so, the thing to be considered is the
result reached, not the possibly inartificial or clumsy way of reaching it." Id. at 94.
28. Professor Allen contends that the Court has never expressly overruled Ferry and
that the position of Justice Holmes remains good law. Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the
Supreme Court, and the Substantive Criminal Law-An Examination of the Limits of
Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEx. L. REV. 269, 286-90 (1977). Apparently, he construes later
decisions as resting on statutory rather than constitutional grounds. Allen, supra note 3,
at 50 n.70. Although there is much good sense in Professor Allen's position, his efforts to
find his view confirmed by the Supreme Court are more heroic than plausible.
29. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
30. Id. at 467.
31. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
32. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
33. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1973); Turner v. United States, 396
U.S. 398, 405 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 n.64 (1969); see Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 n.31 (1975) (prosecution meets its burden with respect to
presumed or inferred fact "by having satisfactorily established" other facts). See also
Underwood, supra note 15, at 1332 n.95; Comment, supra note 14, at 421 (many courts
avoid issue).
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pretation of Winship might differentiate the devices, as presumptions
generally are confined to facts characterized as elements of the offense.
Any functional construction of the reasonable-doubt standard, how-
ever, will treat presumptions and affirmative defenses the same. What
we have called the procedural interpretation of Winship would suggest
that the constitutionality of both devices should turn on the same
criteria, and would require, as a matter of federal constitutional law,
that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact that it chooses
to regard as relevant to the imposition or grade of criminal liability.
This reading of Winship would disable legislatures from employing
either presumptions or affirmative defenses in the definition of crimes,
and it would enforce this disability even in the face of undoubted
legislative authority to adopt a substantively harsher rule of liability.
The revolutionary implications of this procedural analysis went
largely unnoticed in the years immediately following the announcement
of Winship. The message was there, however, waiting to be articulated
and tested in the courts. That opportunity arose in the 1975 decision
of Mullaney v. Wilbur.34
C. The Rise and Fall of Mullaney v. Wilbur
The containment of Winship within the essentially formal bound-
aries of elements of the offense was shattered by the decision in
Mullaney v. Wilbur. There, for the first time, the Court used Winship
to invalidate a selective shift in the burden of proof. A unanimous
Court held unconstitutional Maine's practice of requiring that a
homicide defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he
killed in a sudden heat of passion based on adequate provocation.
Under Maine's system, sufficient proof of adequate provocation would
reduce intentional homicide from murder to manslaughter," classifica-
34. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). For discussion of the history of this case and of the decisions
rendered by the lower courts, see The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
1972-1973 Term, 8 SUFFOLK U.L. RaV. 183, 521-31 (1974); Comment, The Constitutionality
of the Common Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B.U. L. REV. 973 (1974); Com-
ment, Due Process and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains
of Federalism after Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 ME. L. REV. 37 (1974).
35. Maine law punished as murder the unlawful killing of a human being with
"malice aforethought." ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 17, § 2651 (1964). Ordinarily, the require-
ment of malice would be satisfied by proof of intent to kill. But under Maine law, the
defendant's showing of heat of passion based on sudden provocation could preclude a
finding of malice, even though such a showing would not necessarily negate the presence
of an intent to kill. Thus, in Maine, malice aforethought was construed to mean both the
presence of mens rea with respect to the homicide and the absence of heat of passion
based on sudden provocation. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 688 n.9 (1975); State
v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973). See generally Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of
the Law of Homicide: 1, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701 (1937).
1338
Vol. 88: 1325, 1979
Burden of Proof
tions treated as grading distinctions within the single offense of feloni-
ous homicide.36 The absence of provocation was thus not formally an
element of the crime of murder but rather a grading factor within the
broader category of criminal homicide. By applying Winship to facts
not formally classified as elements of the offense, Mullaney suggested
that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not
be limited by the characterizations of state law, but would apply to
some facts extrinsic to the formal definition of an offense.
Beyond this, the decision was ambiguous. Parts of the opinion seemed
to emphasize the traditional role of provocation in distinguishing
murder from manslaughter and the sentencing consequence of that
distinction.37 These factors suggested a focus on the substantive im-
portance of the rule of provocation rather than on a purely procedural
principle for allocating the burden of proof. On this basis, Mullaney
was susceptible to interpretation as a constitutional affirmation of the
traditional content of homicide offenses rather than as a procedural
doctrine of broad applicability beyond that context.38
Yet Mullaney also purported merely to follow Winship, which had
said nothing at all about the substantive content of the criminal law.
Moreover, the Mullaney Court emphasized the differential severity of
the penalties for murder as opposed to those for manslaughter. Under
this analysis, the Court strongly suggested that the reasonable-doubt
requirement would apply to any fact of similar significance. 30 In
short, Mullaney could be read as rejecting outright the largely artificial
distinction between elements of the offense and other kinds of facts
relevant to the imposition or grade of penal liability.
Mullaney tore down the formal constraints on the reasonable-doubt
36. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 661-63 (Me. 1973); State v. Robbins, 295 A.2d 914
(Me. 1972); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 144-46 (Me. 1971). In Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473
F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973) (habeas corpus proceeding), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 1139
(1974), on remand, 496 F.2d 1303 (Ist Cir. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 684 (1975), the Court of
Appeals refused to accept this interpretation of Maine law and characterized it as a novel
construction of state law designed to defeat the defendant's federal constitutional rights.
ComPare Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938) with Ward v. Love County,
253 U.S. 17 (1920). In Mullaney v. Wilbur, however, the Supreme Court overruled the
First Circuit on this point and accepted at face value the previous state-court constructions
of state law. 421 U.S. at 690-91.
37. 421 U.S. at 693-98, 700.
38. For the possibility of this reading of the case, see Allen, supra note 28, at 298; Low
S- Jeffries, DICTA: Constitutionalizing the Criminal Law? Va. L. Weekly, Mar. 25, 1977,
at 1. Factors supporting this interpretation include the Mullaney Court's extensive dis-
cussion of the traditional law of homicide, 421 U.S. at 692-96, and the suggestion in
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence that Mullaney would not override an earlier decision
sustaining a requirement that the defendant bear the burden of persuasion for insanity.
Id. at 705 (discussing Leland v. Oregon, 393 U.S. 790 (1952)).
39. 421 U.S. at 698-701.
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requirement and seemed to set no clear limits on its application. Not
surprisingly, the prevailing response was confusion. Some courts and
most commentators read the case as a condemnation of all affirmative
defenses.40 Many other courts concluded that Mullaney invalidated
some, but not all, burden-shifting defenses.41 Still other jurisdictions
40. See Hallowell v. Keve, 555 F.2d 103, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1977); Zemina v. Solem, 438
F. Supp. 455, 467 n.13 (D.S.D. 1977); Berrier v. Egeler, 428 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Mich.
1976), afrd, 583 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 555 (1978); Grace v. Hopper, 425
F. Supp. 1355 (M.D. Ga. 1977), rev'd, 566 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1977); Gagne v. Meachum,
423 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (D. Mass. 1976); Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 411 F. Supp. 349, 353
(W.D. Va. 1976), rev'd, 572 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978); Moore
v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 739, 224 S.E.2d 856, 857, rev'd, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 247
(1976); State v. Monroe, 236 N.W.2d 24 (Iowa 1975); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349
A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976); State v. Stockett, 278 Or. 637, 565
P.2d 739, 742-43 (1977); Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to
Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REV. 429 (1976); Underwood, supra note 15; Comment,
Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28 BAYLOR L. REV.
120 (1976); Note, supra note 9; Comment, Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur:
New York's Extreme Emotional Disturbance, 43 BROOKLYN L. REv. 171 (1976); Note, Af-
firmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality of Placing a Burden of Persua-
sion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871 (1976); Comment, supra note 14; Com-
ment, Constitutional and Legislative Issues Raised by the Entrapment Defense in Maine,
29 ME. L. REv. 170 (1977); Note, Due Process and the Insanity Defense: Examining Shifts
in the Burden of Production, 53 NoTRE DAME LAw. 123 (1977); Comment, Affirmative
Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828 (1975); Comment, Mens
Rea, Due Process and the Burden of Proving Sanity or Insanity, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 113
(1977); Note, The New York Penal Law's Affimative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur,
27 SYRACUSE L. 11v. 834 (1976); Comment, The Constitutionality of Criminal Affirmative
Defenses: Duress and Coercion, 11 U.S.F. L. Rlv. 123 (1976); 12 WAKE FoRESr L. REv. 423
(1976). These commentaries were generally quite favorable to the supposed abolition of
affirmative defenses. Dissenting voices were raised by Low & Jeffries, supra note 38, and
Allen, supra note 28.
41. The courts commonly uphold a shift of burden through the insanity defense.
This position received support in Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion in Mullaney,
421 U.S. at 704-06, and in the Court's earlier decision in Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790,
795-800 (1952). Neither these opinions nor the lower courts have developed any principled
rationale for distinguishing insanity from provocation as a permissible departure from
the reasonable doubt standard. See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976), discussed
in 63 VA. L. 1Ev. 147 (1977); Hand v. Redman, 416 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Del. 1976); Rivera
v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del.), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question,
429 U.S. 877 (1976); Shanahan v. United States, 354 A.2d 524 (D.C. 1976); Grace v. Hopper,
234 Ga. 669, 217 S.E.2d 267 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976); State v. Berry, 324
So. 2d 822 (La. 1975); State v. Melvin, 341 A.2d 376 (Me. 1975); State v. Bott, 310 Minn.
331, 246 N.W.2d 48 (1976); Guynes v. State, 92 Nev. 693, 558 P.2d 626 (1976); State v.
Taylor, 290 N.C. 220, 226 S.E.2d 23 (1976).
Decisions upholding other affirmative defenses were similarly unsuccessful in distinguish-
ing Mullaney. See United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1975) (upholding claim.
of-right defense to extortion); United States ex rel. Robinson v. Warden, 419 F. Supp. 1
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (upholding unforesecability defense to felony murder); Farrell v. Czarnet-
sky, 417 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1077 (1978) (upholding unarmed defense to aggravated robbery); Mitchell v. State,
342 So. 2d 927 (Ala. Crim. App. 1977) (upholding defense of self-defense); State v. Craw-
ford, 172 Conn. 65, 372 A.2d 154 (1976) (upholding intoxication defense); James v. United
States, 350 A.2d 748 (D.C. 1976) (upholding defense of innocent possession of controlled
substance); Little v. State, 237 Ga. 391, 393-94, 228 S.E.2d 801, 802-03 (1976) (Hill, J., con-
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refused to follow Mullaney beyond its facts and insisted that the crime-
defense distinction should continue to govern elsewhere. 42 Only a few
courts struck down previously approved presumptions in light of
Mullaney.43 Virtually everybody, however, concluded that Mullaney
abandoned any purely formal constraints on the applicability of Win-
ship. Conversely, almost no one interpreted the decision as affecting
the scope of legislative authority to redefine the substantive law.44
Confusion invited clarification, and the opportunity arose after the
New York Court of Appeals refused to follow Mullaney in an almost
identical case. Patterson v. New York 45 involved a modern restatement
of the rule of provocation. It allowed a defendant to mitigate a charge
of murder to manslaughter if he could prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that he acted under extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was reasonable explanation or excuse.4 6 Despite Mullaney,
curring) (upholding defense of justifiable homicide); Cowart v. State, 136 Ga. App. 528,
221 S.E.2d 649 (1975) (upholding abandonment defense to rape); St. Pierre v. State, 92
Nev. 546, 554 P.2d 1126 (1976) (upholding defense of self-defense); State v. Braun, 31 N.C.
App. 101, 228 S.E.2d 466 (1976) (upholding entrapment defense); State v. Downs, 51 Ohio
St. 2d 47, 364 N.E.2d 1140 (1977) (upholding defense to imposition of death penalty);
State v. Bolton, 266 S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976) (upholding defense of self-defense).
Other courts, however, have invalidated defenses that shift the burden to the defendant.
See State v. Anonymous, 33 Conn. Supp. 28, 359 A.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (extreme emo-
tional disturbance mitigation to murder); Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d I (Del. 1975) (same);
Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827, 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975) (self-defense); State v. Hankerson,
288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E.2d 575 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 432 U.S. 233 (1977) (self-
defense); State v. Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977) (self-defense).
42. See United States v. Parr, 516 F.2d 458 (5th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. State, 261 Ark.
714, 551 S.W.2d 203 (1977); People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 544 P.2d 1335, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 135 (1976); People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573
(1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); State v. Pendry, 227 S.E.2d 210 (W. Va. 1976), overruled
in part on unrelated grounds, Jones v. Warden, 241 S.E.2d 914 (1978).
43. See United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301, 305-06 (2d Cir. 1976); State v. Searle,
339 So. 2d 1194, 1201, 1202-05 (La. 1976); Pinkerton v. Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682, 687-88 (W.
Va. 1975); Note, The Validity of Criminal Presumptions in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REv.
1155, 1155-66 (1977); Comment, Presumptions in the Criminal Law of Louisiana, 52
TUL. L. Rxv. 793, 795-800 (1978).
44. See Westberry v. Murphy, 535 F.2d 1333 (1st Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Rock
v. Pinkey, 430 F. Supp. 176 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Street v. Warden, 423 F. Supp. 611 (D. Md.
1976); State v. Nowlin, 244 N.W.2d 596 (Iowa 1976); Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349
A.2d 300 (1975), aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976); People v. Martin, 75 Mich. App.
6, 254 N.W.2d 623 (1977); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 283, 226 S.E.2d 656 (1976); State v.
Thompson, 88 Wash. 2d 13, 558 P.2d 202, appeal dismissed for want of a substantial
federal question, 434 U.S. 898 (1977); State ex rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver, 233 S.E. 425
(IV. Va. 1977). But cf. Tushnet, Constitutional Limitations of Substantive Criminal Law:
Adn Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U. L. REv. 775 (1975)
(Wilbur restricts state imposition of strict liability and requires mental element to be
included in definition of crime).
45. 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (aff'g 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976)).
46. See N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 125.20(2), .25(l)(a) (McKinney 1975). The New York statutes
defining first-degree and second.degree murder made it an affirmative defense that the
"defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
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the New York court upheld the statute,47 and the Supreme Court
affirmed.
The Court pinned its change of direction on an exceedingly fine
distinction between Patterson and Mullaney. Maine law had specified
"malice" as an essential ingredient of murder. "Malice" denoted both
mens rea with respect to homicide and the absence of sudden heat of
passion based on adequate provocation. Therefore, said the Court,
requiring the defendant to prove provocation impermissibly relieved
the state of its due process obligation to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt every element of the crime charged.48 The Patterson statute, in
contrast, avoided the term "malice." Because this law did not formally
identify the absence of extreme emotional disturbance as part of its
definition of murder, Winship did not apply.49 In essence, the Patter-
son Court evaded Mullaney by reviving the formal distinction between
an element of the crime and a fact necessary for a defense to criminal
liability.
This analysis drew a dissent from the author of Mullaney, Justice
Powell. He argued that the majority's formalistic approach disregarded
the concerns of the earlier opinion and made the command of Win-
ship entirely dependent on legislative classifications: "The test the
Court today establishes allows a legislature to shift, virtually at will,
the burden of persuasion with respect to any factor in a criminal
case, so long as it is careful not to mention the nonexistence of that
factor in the statutory language that defines the crime." 0 Powell
decried this implicit overruling of Mullaney5l and advanced instead
his own reinterpretation of that precedent-a quasi-historical view that
would have barred shifting the burden of proof with respect to any
factor historically significant in determining punishment and stigma.5 2
Doctrinally, at least, Mullaney and Patterson appear to have been a
wash. The general understanding of Winship after Patterson is just
what it was before Mullaney: A state must prove beyond a reasonable
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as
the defendant believed them to be." Id. The statutes further provided that extreme emo-
tional disturbance would not constitute a defense to manslaughter. Id.
The New York formulation of the rule of provocation derived from MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2 (P.O.D. 1962), which is similar in substance but which does not shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant.
47. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1976), afj'd,
432 U.S. 197 (1977).
48. 432 U.S. at 215.
49. Id. at 206-07, 216.
50. Id. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Note, The Constitutionality of Affirmative
Defenses After Patterson v. New York, 78 COLUmn. L. REV. 655, 666-67 (1978).
51. 432 U.S. at 221-25.
52. Id. at 226-27. For criticism of this approach, see pp. 1361-64 infra.
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doubt those facts that formally define the crime charged but not those
facts that establish a defense or a mitigation of liability. However
familiar the distinction, this resolution of Winship seems unstable
and unsatisfactory. The distinction between "crime" and "defense"
remains essentially arbitrary. 53 Even agreeing, as we do, with the out-
come of Patterson, we must conclude that the element-of-the-offense
analysis is too flimsy to sustain that result. Not only is that analysis
easier to state than to apply; as subsequent experience indicates," it
53. Emphasis on the formal distinction between an element of an offense and a de-
fense may well ensure that courts do not frustrate the legislature's presumed intent as to
which side should bear the burden of persuasion on any given issue. In other words, a
purely formal and limited reading of Winship might be grounded in an understanding
that due process requires a state to employ in every particular instance the allocation of
the burden of proof that the legislature has mandated to be used generally. But several
problems arise with this approach. It is true that in at least some instances a judicial
creation of a presumption or an affirmative defense might depart from legislative intent.
But, as Mullaney held, "state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law," 421 U.S. at
691. Absent "obvious subterfuge to evade consideration of a federal issue," a state
court's construction of what the legislature intended is binding on a federal court. Id. at
691 n.ll (quoting Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 129 (1945)). And
even if a legislature's intent were unquestionably frustrated in a given case, the court
would merely have misconstrued state law, an error that does not in and of itself assume
constitutional dimensions. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108-09 (1945) (state
officials acting in violation of state law do not necessarily cause deprivation of constitu-
tional rights). Moreover, the formal interpretation has clearly not been applied to
presumptions. Many of the cases in which the courts have held a presumption unconstitu-
tional involved jury instructions that were mandated expressly by the legislature. See
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 30-32 (1969); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136,
138-39 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943); United States v. Moore, 571
F.2d 76, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1978).
54. The courts have interpreted Patterson's impact on Mullaney to permit a range of
results. Compare Frazier v. Weatherholtz, 512 F.2d 994 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
876 (1978) (approving burden on defendant to prove self-defense) and State v. Humphries,
51 Ohio St. 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977) (defendant waived objections to jury instruction
giving him burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses) with Berrier v. Egeler, 583
F.2d 515, 518-19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 555 (1978) (rejecting placement on de-
fendant of burden to prove self-defense) and United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003 (7th
Cir. 1978) (same; held not plain error) and Cole v. Stevenson, 447 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D.N.C.
1978) (self-defense and malice instructions unconstitutionally place burden of persuasion
on defendant) and State v. Columbus, 258 NAV.2d 122, 123 (Minn. 1977) (not reversible
error, although incorrect instruction placing burden to prove self-defense on defendant).
At least one state has read Patterson to invalidate presumptions. State v. McGhee, 350 So.
2d 370, 375 (La. 1977) (reversible error that state relieved of burden in presuming theft
from unexplained possession).
In addition, courts have attributed their holdings to the peculiarities of particular de-
fenses or statutory schemes. Compare People v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95, 374 N.E.2d 972 (1978)
(states need not negate statutory exemptions to crime) and People v. D'Angelo, 401 Mich.
167, 257 N.W.2d 655 (1978) (approving defendant's burden to prove entrapment because
that defense concerns not guilt but police conduct) and Stillwell v. Commonwealth, 247
S.E.2d 360 (Va. 1978) (approving defendant's burden to rebut statutory presumptions with
proof of accomodation in distributing marijuana) with Turner v. Wolff, 581 F.2d 235
(9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting statutory presumption of intent to commit larceny or felony
because presumption imposes burden on defendant to explain breaking and entering) and
Graham v. Maryland, 454 F. Supp. 643 (D. Md. 1978) (unconstitutional placement of
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also fails to respond to the genuine concerns that underlay Winship
and Mullaney. Furthermore, Patterson provides no resolution of the
confusion and irrationality that have long pervaded the constitutional
analysis of presumptions in the penal law.
As a first step toward addressing these problems, it is necessary to
show why, at least in terms of results, Patterson was right and Mullaney
wrong. As the reactions of commentators have made clear,55 that con-
clusion is not intuitively obvious. It derives from an analysis of the
constitutional underpinning and practical implications of what we
have called the procedural interpretation of Winship.
D. Flaws in the Procedural Approach
We begin by considering the paradigmatic case of a purely proce-
dural interpretation of Winship. This is the position suggested by
Mullaney, but disavowed in Patterson. It is the solution adopted by
more than a few lower courts and by most academic commentators. 0
Moreover, analysis of the paradigmatic case reveals most starkly the
error of treating a constitutional rule regarding burden of proof as
a question divorced from the substance of the penal law.
1. A Theoretical Critique
As has been noted, a purely procedural interpretation of Winship
would enforce the reasonable-doubt requirement without reference
to the scope of legislative authority over the substance of the law. The
prosecution would be constitutionally required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every fact material to the imposition or grade of penal
liability. This rule would disallow presumptions and affirmative de-
fenses in the definition of crimes, but it would not alter legislative
burden on defendant to prove alibi defense) and State v. Templeton, 258 N.W.2d 380,
384 (Iowa 1977) (Rowlings, J., dissenting) (objecting to burden placed on defendant to
establish intent-negating intoxication). For discussions of the variety of possible interpreta-
tions of Patterson, see Farrell v. Czarnetsky, 566 F.2d 381, 382 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J.,
concurring) and Note, supra note 50.
55. See Eule, The Presumption of Sanity: Bursting the Bubble, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
637, 677-83 (1978); Note, supra note 50; Note, Burden of Proving Affirmative Defense Can
Be Placed on Defendant, 29 MERcER L. RFv. 875 (1978); Note, Affirmative Criminal De-
fenses-The Reasonable Doubt Rule in the Aftermath of Patterson v. New York, 39
OHIO ST. L.J. 393 (1978); 23 N.Y.L.S. REv. 802 (1978); 31 OKLA. L. RFv. 411 (1978).
The only major effort to defend Patterson is in Allen, supra note 3. Professor Allen's
defense of Patterson seems to be grounded in part on his view that the Court did not in
fact revert to the formalistic limitation of the reasonable-doubt requirement to elements
of the offense, despite the majority opinion's statements to the contrary. Compare id. at
48-49 with p. 1342 & notes 48-49 supra. Professor Allen believes that Patterson embraces the
"greater-includes-the-lesser" rule.
56. See note 40 supra.
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authority over the substance of the law. The state would be free, with-
in otherwise applicable constitutional limits, to choose what facts to
make relevant to criminal liability and grading. Once having chosen,
however, the state would be required to establish the existence of the
specified facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, for example, a state
would be forbidden from basing a defense on the defendant's ability
to show the exculpatory facts, even if it could eliminate the defense
altogether. Similarly, the government would be barred from regard-
ing proof of Y as sufficient evidence of X, even though it could make
Y alone an independently sufficient basis of liability. In the usual case
in which the shift in the burden of proof is not accompanied by any
violation of the applicable constitutional limits on the content of
crime definition, the legislature would be free to respond to the in-
validation of a presumption or an affirmative defense by undertaking
to prove either more or less, as it sees fit.
The first fault of this approach is its illogic. The procedural inter-
pretation of Winship would allow the government to abolish a given
ground of exculpation, but not to retain it as an affirmative defense.
It would permit the state to punish Y without reference to X but not
to allow conviction based on an authorized inference of X from proof
of Y. Normally, one would expect the greater power to include the
lesser. As Mr. Justice Holmes pointed out,57 legislative authority to
punish Y standing alone should encompass the lesser authority to pun-
ish Y when X is not rebutted. Similarly, legislative competence to
abolish a defense altogether should include a fortiori the power to
shift to the defendant the burden of establishing its existence. Yet the
procedural interpretation of Winship would contradict this logic and
deny the validity of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument. Instead,
the procedural approach to burden of proof would force the state to
choose between the extremes of proving more or proving less. On the
face of it, we find it hard to believe that this incongruity is constitu-
tionally mandated.
The logic of the greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument seems
compelling; it could be avoided only if one could identify an in-
dependent rationale for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In other
words, a purely procedural interpretation of Winship-one that is
wholly illogical as a statement of substantive policy-must find its justi-
fication in an exclusively procedural concern that exists no matter
what the content of the underlying substantive issue. The case for
reading Winship to disallow every exception to proof beyond a rea-
57. See p. 1337 & note 27 suPra.
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sonable doubt boils down to a search for some such exclusively pro-
cedural justification.
The chief justification for proof beyond a reasonable doubt in gen-
eral has always been thought to be that it enhances the certainty of
the factual findings needed for criminal conviction. 58 Close questions
are resolved in favor of the accused, and the use of penal sanctions is
thereby restricted to cases in which the proof of guilt is overwhelm-
ing. To this end, the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
introduces a deliberate imbalance into the factfinding process. 0 It
favors individual liberty at the expense of societal order and thus
gives voice to the basic political value choice captured in the phrase
"presumption of innocence." 0 This preference is reflected in a stan-
dard of proof that biases factual dispute resolution in favor of the
criminal accused. 61
The trouble is that this rationale does not justify the rule for which
it is offered. Implementing the presumption of innocence-whether
on an actual or a symbolic level-requires that something be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not, however, speak to the question
of what that something must be. In particular, the proffered justifica-
tions for the reasonable-doubt requirement do not establish that every
fact relevant to the imposition or grade of penal liability must be
subject to that standard. In our view, these rationales extend only
58. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 190-91; Underwood, supra note 15,
at 1306-07.
59. Professor Underwood accepts this justification for the reasonable-doubt require-
ment, but also suggests that this standard of proof may in addition be understood as a
corrective measure designed to redress the problem that factfinders may favor the
prosecution. Underwood, supra note 15, at 1306-07. The basis for this supposition is,
however, not documented-a point that Professor Allen emphasizes in his rebuttal of the
argument. Allen, supra note 3, at 43 n.60.
60. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.")
. 61. Professor Underwood endorses this rationale but posits as a second and distinct
purpose for the reasonable-doubt requirement a "symbolic function . .. to single out
criminal convictions as peculiarly serious among the adjudications made by courts."
Underwood, supra note 15, at 1307. Professor Underwood suggests a deterrent effect from
this symbolic function. The hypothesis seems to be that requiring proof beyond a reason-
able doubt increases the stigma that attaches to criminal conviction and thereby in-
creases the deterrent effect of the threat of conviction. We would have thought, and
Professor Underwood admits the possibility, see id. at 1307-08, that any such effect would
be more than offset by the reduced likelihood of obtaining conviction in the first place.
A third hypothesis, which may be the most plausible of all, is that the standard of proof
probably has an insignificant impact on deterrence one way or the other.
Professor Underwood also suggests that the symbolism of the rule affirms our "shared
moral purpose" regarding the appropriate relationship between the state and the criminal
accused. Id. at 1308. It is unclear what this formulation adds to the accepted prodefendant
purpose of the reasonable-doubt requirement.
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so far as the substantive issue at stake is thought to be an essential
ingredient of the state's case. When, in contrast, the state considers a
gratuitous defense, that is, one that it may grant or deny as it sees fit,
a constitutional insistence on proof beyond a reasonable doubt no
longer make sense. Such a rule would purport to preserve individual
liberty and the societal sense of commitment to it by forcing the gov-
ernment either to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt or
to eliminate the defense altogether. The latter solution results in an
extension of penal liability despite the presence of mitigating or ex-
culpatory facts. It is difficult to see this result as constitutionally com-
pelled and harder still to believe that it flows from a general policy,
whether actual or symbolic, in favor of individual liberty.0 2 When a
constitutional commitment to individual liberty is construed to induce
harshness in the penal law, something is plainly amiss.
The trouble lies in trying to define justice in exclusively procedural
terms. Winship's insistence on the reasonable-doubt standard is thought
to express a preference for letting the guilty go free rather than risk-
ing conviction of the innocent. This value choice, however, cannot be
implemented by a purely procedural concern with burden of proof.
Guilt and innocence are substantive concepts. Their content depends
on the choice of facts determinative of liability. If this choice is re-
mitted to unconstrained legislative discretion, no rule of constitutional
procedure can restrain the potential for injustice. A normative prin-
ciple for protecting the "innocent" must take into account not only
the certainty with which facts are established but also the selection of
facts to be proved. A constitutional policy to minimize the risk of
convicting the "innocent" must be grounded in a constitutional con-
ception of what may constitute "guilt." Otherwise "guilt" would have
to be proved with certainty, but the legislature could define "guilt"
as it pleased, and the grand ideal of individual liberty would be re-
duced to an empty promise. This doctrine would force a legislative
election between proving more or proving less, but it would not re-
duce the risk of convicting the "innocent" in any save a cruelly for-
mal sense. There would be no virtue in such a result, and it defies
reason to believe that this constitutional coercion to extend criminal
liability is justified by a general constitutional bias in favor of the
criminal accused.
62. There is no apparent reason to believe that the symbolic value of society's com-
mitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is in any way impaired by the existence of
presumptions and affirmative defenses. These devices have existed for a long time and
have not been widely perceived or popularly condemned as invasions of the presumption
of innocence.
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It may clarify the argument to consider statutory rape. Legislatures
have long been thought competent to punish consensual intercourse
with an underage female without regard to the defendant's state of
mind as to her age. Under existing precedents, a state may authorize
conviction of statutory rape despite mistake as to age, and many states
do just that. 3 If, despite such authority, a legislature chooses to create
an affirmative defense of honest and reasonable mistake, what sense
would it make to disallow that defense on the grounds that it inade-
quately protects the innocent? If the state can simply declare the
accused guilty no matter how plainly an honest mistake could be
shown, constitutional disallowance of the more generous scheme of
an affirmative defense for reasonable mistake borders on the perverse.
Yet a constitutional preference for the harsher solution is exactly
what is achieved by a rigidly procedural interpretation of Winship.
The point, of course, is not that the reasonable-doubt requirement
is inappropriate, but only that constitutional insistence on that stan-
dard should take account of the scope of legislative authority over
the definition of crimes. Within the range of permissible legislative
choice, the greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument is fully appli-
cable. On the other hand, federal constitutional law appropriately
should require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of those matters that
the state is constitutionally required to establish. For example, the
fundamental requirement that every definition of a crime should in-
clude a criminal act would bar a legislature from punishing as criminal
the bare desire to have sexual intercourse with an underage person.
Because the act of intercourse or some conduct preparatory thereto
would be an essential prerequisite for criminal liability, it is entirely
sensible to insist that such conduct be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Any lower standard would fail to vindicate the strong societal
bias against conviction of the innocent. A constitutional rule fixing
the burden of proof is sensible in the case of statutory rape precisely
because the rule would not be subject to evasion by exercise of the
legislature's "greater power" over the substance of the penal law.
Virtually alone among the proponents of a procedural interpreta-
tion of Winship, Professor Underwood has attempted to answer the
point that legislative power to withdraw an exculpation altogether
would ordinarily include the lesser power to shift the burden of proof
63. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-6101(1) (1948 & Supp. 1978) (as interpreted in light of
State v. Suennan, 36 Idaho 219, 209 P. 1072 (1922)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1970 &
Supp. 1975) (as interpreted in light of State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E.2d 314 (1944));
S.C. CODE § 16-3-650 (1976) (as interpreted in light of State v. Whitener, 228 S.C. 244, 89
S.E.2d 701, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 861 (1955)).
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pertaining to it. As has been noted, the fundamental and pervasive
defect in her argument is the unarticulated assumption that the ra-
tionales for requiring proof of something beyond a reasonable doubt
necessarily state rationales for requiring proof of everything by that
standard. Once that error is exposed, it becomes clear that the tradi-
tional understanding of the reasonable-doubt requirement provides
no affirmative case for extending Winship to cover every fact relevant
to criminal liability or grading. To her credit, Professor Underwood
confronts this prospect and responds by suggesting four additional and
independent justifications for a constitutional requirement of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 Each of them purports to apply even
within the scope of undoubted legislative authority over the substance
of the penal law.
First, Professor Underwood contends that a purely procedural in-
terpretation of Winship would conform to a constitutional pattern of
regulating process without regard to substance.65 She seems to contend
that because such guarantees as the right to counsel and trial by jury
are applicable no matter what the content of the law, the constitu-
tional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt must apply
on the same terms. The trouble is that the argument begs the ques-
tion. The issue is not whether there is a purely procedural justification
for right to counsel or trial by jury. The issue is whether there is a
purely procedural justification for a constitutional rule fixing the
burden of proof, that is, a justification of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard in terms not related to or limited by the scope of legislative
authority over the substance of the law. No such justification is es-
tablished by pointing to the undisputed existence of purely procedural
guarantees elsewhere in the Constitution."0
64. Underwood, supra note 15, at 1316-30.
65. Id. at 1317-20.
66. Moreover, Professor Underwood's description of constitutional text and pattern is
at times quite forced. She uses an analogy to the equal protection clause as a means of
avoiding the greater-power-includes-the-lesser analysis:
A denial of equal protection can be remedied by treating everyone equally badly, or
by treating everyone equally well. A legislature that is ambivalent about extending
a substantive right might choose to compromise by extending it to part of the
population. Because the requirement of equal protection at least sometimes prevents
that sort of compromise, it might push a legislature to abandon a wise policy rather
than extend it equally to everyone. For this reason the wisdom of requiring equality,
like the wisdom of requiring procedural uniformity, might be questioned.
Id. at 1319 (footnote omitted). The argument seems to ignore the fact that, precisely for
the reason stated, equality has not been required, despite a reasonably explicit textual
mandate. The equal protection clause has never been taken to enforce a generally ap-
plicable guarantee against differential treatment. On the contrary, review under the
equal protection clause tends to have bite only when some independent value is at stake.
Thus, most emphatically the equal protection clause protects racial and ethnic minorities
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Underwood's second point is that the kind of legislative compro-
mise represented by the adoption of an affirmative defense is inap-
propriate under any circumstances.6 7 This observation is more in the
nature of epithet than argument. The discussion designed to support
it merely reiterates Professor Underwood's conclusion that the reasons
for the reasonable-doubt requirement apply in all cases.6 8
Underwood's third and most important point is advanced under
the rubric of "truth-in-labeling."609 She finds in the use of affirmative
defenses a tendency "to trap an unsuspecting public" 70 and "to deny
citizens the fair notice that is constitutionally required of the criminal
law." 71 This argument merely derives from the somewhat more plausi-
ble point that presumptions work to disguise the substance of the law.
That contention is discussed elsewhere.72 For present purposes, it is
necessary only to note that, whatever one's view of the obfuscatory
potential of presumptions, there is no reason to regard an affirmative
defense as misdescriptive of anything. Interestingly, on close inspection
it appears that Professor Underwood herself does not claim that af-
against discrimination on that basis. With respect to this independent value-independent,
that is, of the scope of legislative authority over the subject matter of the law in ques-
tion-the legislature simply has no "greater power."
67. Id. at 1320-23.
68. Like so much of the argument for a procedural interpretation on Winship, Under-
wood's discussion of an "inappropriate form of compromise" tends to assume the point in
issue. Consider, for example, the following passage:
A legislature uncertain as to the merits of a proposed defense might reasonably wish
to change its assessment of the relative costs of errors [relating to the admitted func-
tion of the reasonable-doubt requirement in order to introduce a deliberate imbalance
into that assessment]. But a constitutional valuation of the relative costs of errors
cannot be avoided by legislative fiat. So long as the factual determination has the
function and consequences that characterize other issues in a criminal case, such as
enhanced stigma and an increased period of potential incarceration, the reasons for
the constitutional rule remain. The costs of erroneous convictions and erroneous
acquittals are not different by virtue of the gratuitous character of the defense.
Id. at 1322. Now, of course it is true that a constitutional rule cannot be overturned by
legislative fiat, but the question in dispute is the scope of the constitutional rule. The
case for a given rule is not made by assuming its existence.
Beyond that, Underwood's point is a reformulation in the language of "error" of her
earlier point about the necessity of an exceptionless adherence to proof beyond a reason-
able doubt in order to protect the "innocent." In both manifestations, the argument
would embrace as a matter of constitutional law a purely procedural conception of the
evil at stake. Thus, for example, Professor Underwood would regard as a constitutional
error the conviction of one who was unable to establish an affirmative defense of mistake
of age for statutory rape, but would accept as involving no such error the conviction of
one whose undoubted mistake was disregarded by the substantive law. The content of
this concept of "error" is thus dependent on legislative crime definition. A purportedly
constitutional rule that fails to take account of that fact in its effort to prevent "error"
is an exercise in pointless illogic.
69. Id. at 1323-25; see Note, supra note 50, at 667.
70. Underwood, supra note 15, at 1323.
71. Id. at 1324.
72. See pp. 1390-92 infra.
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firmative defenses are descriptively confusing. Instead, she asserts that
affirmative defenses, although by hypothesis perfectly intelligible to
anyone who bothers to look, are nevertheless deceptive in that they
depart from what she supposes that an ordinary citizen thinks the
law to be.73 Professor Underwood apparently believes that there exists
a "widely shared expectation" in society that every jot and tittle of
crime definition must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and fur-
ther that it would be unconstitutional to contradict that expectation. 74
Both assumptions are faulty. A heroic effort would be required to
show any settled expectation regarding the allocation of the burden
of proof for an "affirmative defense." Of course, there may be wide-
spread appreciation that something must be proved beyond a reason-
able doubt, but that is not the point of dispute. More importantly,
this argument has nothing to do with descriptive deceptiveness in the
definition of crime. No matter who may wish to create a constitutional
obligation to match popular understanding of the content of the penal
law, no such obligation exists, nor may it be invented by mere assertion.
Finally, Professor Underwood invokes the bugaboo of the "slippery
slope. ' 7 5 She argues that the greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument
is hard to confine within acceptable limits. In other words, Under-
wood assumes that the Constitution places few limits on the defini-
tion of crimes and consequently that the legislature's "greater power"
is too great to be tolerated. Whether or not this supposition is true,
it is irrelevant to the task of justifying a procedural interpretation of
In re Winship. The force of the greater-power-includes-the-lesser ar-
gument in no way depends on the scope of the greater power. The
illogic of coercing legislatures toward substantively extreme choices
in their definition of crimes remains exactly the same no matter what
one assumes to be the permissible range of legislative choice. Whatever
the reach of legislative authority over the substance of the law, within
that sphere it remains fundamentally unsound to require adherence
to a constitutional rule fixing the standard of proof.76
Our purpose is not to debate every aspect of Underwood's exposition.
It is only to ensure that all of the suggested justifications for a pro-
cedural interpretation of Winship have been taken into account. In
73. Underwood, supra note 15, at 1325.
74. Id. at 1324-25.
75. Id. at 1325-80.
76. As part of her "slippery slope" discussion, Professor Underwood also suggests that
the greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument is defective in that it would necessarily
encompass such procedural guarantees as the defendant's right to fair notice of the
charges against him. Id. at 1329-30. For a convincing refutation of this contention, see
Allen, supra note 3, at 35 n.60.
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our view, none of these arguments can fairly be taken to support an
exceptionless constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. More specifically, none has force in the context of legislative
authority to redefine the substance of the law. Especially is this failure
evident when one remembers the constitutional standard by which
the issue must be judged. Due process means "fundamental fairness." 77
It requires the government to observe the essentials of fair treatment.78
The standard is hardly self-executing, but at least it should be clear
that the procedures embraced as essentials of due process should be
in some sense important-not merely convenient or familiar, but fun-
damental to justice. No doubt the reasonable-doubt standard is funda-
mental in its application to the essential prerequisites of penal liability.
But within the sphere of the legislature's "greater power" over the
substance of the law, such is not the case. Far from being fundamental,
the reasonable-doubt standard is, within that context, entirely unre-
lated to any plausible perception of unfairness in the penal law.
Furthermore, a purely procedural insistence on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not only a rule without apparent justification; it
is also a doctrine without principled limit. Specifically, no reason
appears to confine the reasonable-doubt requirement to facts material
to liability or grading. For example, this purportedly constitutional
standard of proof may just as easily apply to facts relevant to sentenc-
ing. From the defendant's point of view, variations in sentencing
within an authorized range may be of far greater consequence than
conviction of an offense of one or another grade of liability.79 Might
77. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 359; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 562 (1966).
79. In Mullaney the Court quite correctly rejected the state's contention that the
reasonable-doubt standard should not apply simply because the rule of provocation was a
grading distinction within the crime of felonious homicide rather than an element of the
offense of murder:
The safeguards of due process are not rendered unavailable simply because a deter-
mination may already have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and
that might lead to a significant impairment of personal liberty. The fact remains that
the consequences resulting from a verdict of murder, as compared with a verdict of
manslaughter, differ significantly. Indeed, when viewed in terms of the potential
differences in the restrictions of personal liberty attendant to each conviction, the dis-
tinction established by Maine between murder and manslaughter may be of greater
importance than the difference between guilt and innocence for many lesser crimes.
421 U.S. at 698 (emphasis added). This reasoning would seem to apply with equal force
to facts relevant to sentencing, for the "potential differences in the restrictions of personal
liberty" arising from different sentences for the same crime may be even greater. Thus,
for example, Maine law specified the penalty for murder as life imprisonment and set a
maximum penalty for manslaughter of imprisonment for 20 years. ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17, § 2551 (1964) (repealed 1975). The difference between 20 years and life is cer-
tainly great, but so is the difference between 20 years and 10 or 5 or 1. Although the
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not the rationale (whatever it is) for requiring proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of all facts determinative of liability or grading also
extend to facts influential in sentencing? The result would be whole-
sale displacement of the existing law of sentencing and imposition in
its place of a highly rigid system with individual outcomes entirely
controlled by specified facts established beyond a reasonable doubt
through the process of adversarial litigation. Perhaps there may be
something to be said for such a scheme, but we know of no one who
has proposed so radical a constitutionalization of the law of sen-
tencing.8 0 At the same time, a purely procedural interpretation of
Winship lacks any internal reason to stop short of this result, and
advocates of that view have neglected to explain this point.8'
2. A Practical Evaluation
The procedural interpretation of Winship would not only be il-
logical in concept; it would also be potentially pernicious in effect. It
is at least plausible, indeed we think it likely, that a rule barring re-
allocation of the burden of proof would thwart legislative reform of
the penal law and stifle efforts to undo injustice in the traditional
law of crimes. Even if one were to believe that rigid insistence on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt might in some purely symbolic
sense reaffirm the "presumption of innocence," it would do so at the
risk of a harsh and regressive expansion in the definition of guilt.
This is a point of some importance, for, quite surprisingly, pro-
ponents of a procedural interpretation of Winship have made exactly
the contrary argument.8 2 They assume that forcing legislatures to
former disparity would be resolved by the terms of the conviction, and the latter would
be left to sentencing, no reason appears to distinguish between the two in terms of the
Mullaney interpretation of Winship.
80. See generally Hollis v. Smith, 571 F.2d 685, 694-96 (2d Cir. 1978); Note, A Hidden
Issue of Sentencing: Burdens of Proof for Disputed Allegations in Presentence Reports,
66 GEo. L.J. 1515 (1978).
81. Professor Underwood suggests that the reasonable-doubt requirement should ex-
tend to facts pertinent to sentencing when such facts "involve labeling and stigma as
well as incarceration." Underwood, supra note 15, at 1326 n.83. Yet the conceptual frame-
work adopted in her article does not reach sentencing explicitly. See id. at 1338-47. Pro-
ferror Underwood identifies as facts to which, even under her scheme, the reasonable-
doubt requirement would not apply those "facts that are tied more closely to the proper
administration of institutions than to the justification for convicting the defendant," id.
at 1340, and those facts that "must be resolved to determine whether a case is properly
before a court," id. at 1342. The former category includes issues of the admissibility of
evidence, while the latter encompasses such questions as double jeopardy, jurisdiction, and
venue. Neither category would seem to reach facts relevant to determining the sentence. In
contrast, the alternative construction of Winship advanced in this article would not apply
to sentencing facts.
82. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 189; Underwood, supra note 15, at
1318; Note, supra note 50, at 667.
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choose between proving more and proving less would produce good
choices. In other words, they argue that a legislature required to
abandon an affirmative defense would be likely to force the prosecu-
tion to disprove the existence of a ground of exculpation beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than to eliminate it altogether. Popular pres-
sure, it is asserted, would act as a check against untoward expansion of
criminal liability. The net effect, therefore, of disallowing the in-
termediate solution of an affirmative defense would be a benign and
progressive influence on the substance of the penal law.
Aside from failing to demonstrate whether this supposition, even
if true, would be sufficient basis for constitutional adjudication, ad-
vocates of the procedural approach fail to produce evidence to support
the supposition. The best evidence of what legislatures would do if
they were forced to abandon the affirmative defense is the catalogue
of uses to which that device is currently put. If it were used to disguise
harsh innovations in the law of crimes, one might reasonably infer
that elimination of the procedural device would have an ameliorative
effect on substance. In point of fact, however, the burden-shifting
defense quite generally is employed to moderate traditional rigors in
the law of crimes. There is, therefore, reason to believe that rejection
of this device would result in abandonment of the underlying sub-
stantive innovations and reversion to older and harsher rules of penal
liability.
In order to test this proposition, we surveyed the practices of the
33 American states that have recently enacted comprehensive revisions
of their penal laws.8 3 These are the jurisdictions that in modem times
83. ALA. CODE §§ 13A-I-1 to -14-5 (Supp. 1977 & Supp. 1978) (effective June 1, 1979);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11-16-100 to -81-900 (Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1980); ARiz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-101 to -4202 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-123 to -4706 (1964 & Supp.
1975) (scattered sections amended 1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-101 to -15-108 (1973 &
Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-1 to -212 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 101-
9017 (1974 & Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.01-893.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1978); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-101 to -9948a (1978 & Supp. 1978); HAwAII REV. STAT. §§ 701-100 to
-853-4 (1976 & Supp. 1978); Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1-1 to -1105
(Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-2-3 to -50-6-6 (Burns 1975 &
Supp. 1978); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 701.1-732.6, 901.1-909.6 (West Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-3101 to -4619 (1974 & Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 500.010-534.060 (1975 &
Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 1-1357 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 609.01-624.73 (West 1964 & Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 556.011-578.010 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CoDEs ANN. §§ 94-1-101 to -8-431 (Supp. 1976) (scattered sections
amended 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101 to -1462 (Supp. 1977) (scattered sections
amended 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 625:1-651:61 (1974) (scattered sections amended
1977); New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, L.1978, ch. 95, 1978 N.J. Sess. Law Serv.
292 (West) (to be codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to :98-4) (effective Sept. 1,
1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-1-1 to -29-25 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (scattered sections
amended 1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1.00-500.5 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1978-79); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-01 to -33-04 (1976 & Supp. 1977); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01-
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have had an occasion to confront the issues here under discussion.
Eight of these states provide no statutory guidance on this point,8 4
and six more expressly require that the prosecution bear the burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for every fact needed to obtain
convictions 5 However, nineteen states have enacted revised codes that
include burden-shifting defenses. Virtually all of these uses of the bur-
den-shifting defense mark instances of benevolent innovation in the
penal law. s6 Thirteen states recognize an affirmative defense of re-
nunciation for the crime of attempt.8 7 Nine permit reasonable mis-
take as to age as an affirmative defense to statutory rape.88 Eight create
an affirmative defense to liability for felony murder,8 9 and six ex-
onerate the accused if he can show reasonable reliance on an official
misstatement of law9 ° In each of these cases, the affirmative defense
is used to introduce a new ground of exculpation, often in circum-
stances where an obligation to disprove its existence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt would be especially onerous. None of the named de-
fenses existed at common law,91 and none is a traditional feature of
2929.61 (Page 1975 & Supp. 1978-79); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.005-169.690 (1977); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 101-7505 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1978-79); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 22-1-1
to -42-13 (Supp. 1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 1.01 to fit. 11, § 71.05 (Vernon
1974 & Supp. 1978-79); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-101 to -10-1401 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 9A.04.010-.88.100 (1977); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.01-949.18 (West 1958 & Supp.
1978-79).
We have omitted Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and Virginia from the list of jurisdictions that
have recently reformed their penal laws. In the case of Louisiana, the date of the last
revision (1942) prevents attribution of the change to the inspiration of the Model Penal
Code. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:7-:501 (West. 1974 & Supp. 1979). In the cases of Puerto
Rico and Virginia, the revision did little more than memorialize prior law; the condifica-
tions there cannot fairly be categorized as comprehensive revisions. See P.R. LAws ANN.
tit. 33, §§ 3001-4628 (Supp. 1977); VA. CODE §§ 16.1-69.1 to 21-428 (Supp. 1975).
84. These states are Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico,
and Wisconsin.
85. ALA. CODE § 13A-1-2(14) (Supp. 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-407 (1973 & Supp.
1976); Criminal Code of 1961, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 3-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); OHIo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2901.05 (Page Supp. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(3) (Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-501, -502(2)(b), -504 (1978).
86. See Appendix, p. 1398 infra (describing uses of these defenses).
87. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas. See Appendix,
p. 1400 infra.
88. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington. See Appendix, p. 1403 infra; id. (six states provide
defense to rape of reasonable mistake as to capacity of victim to consent).
89. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, New York, North Dakota,
Oregon, and Washington. See Appendix, p. 1401 infra.
90. These states are Arkansas, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, and
Texas. See Appendix, p. 1398 infra. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (P.O.D. 1962).
91. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw § 9.3 (1978) (mistake as to age
not traditionally recognized as defense to rape); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 37-45 (2d ed.
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American statutes.92 A plausible conclusion is that shifting the burden
of proof is often politically necessary to secure legislative reform.93
It seems quite possible, therefore, that disallowance of this procedural
device would work to inhibit reform and induce retrogression in the
penal law.
II. Substantive Justice
Ultimately, the procedural interpretation of Winship fails to pro-
mote the primary concern that motivates its own adherents: the con-
cern for substantive justice. It is this concern that condemns the
formalistic formulation of the rule of Winship that enshrines the
"elements of the offense" as the only items worthy of the reasonable-
doubt standard. 94 To some extent, this is also the interest that joins
different factions on the Court in the effort to define the scope of
Winship. Although serious shortcomings mar recent attempts to link
the rules governing proof and presumptions to the underlying con-
cern for substantive justice, these efforts improve upon the catego-
rically procedural interpretation of Winship that Mullaney suggested.
To promote justice, the scope of the reasonable-doubt standard must
turn on the substantive limits on the legislative power to define crime
and punishment.
1969) (traditionally no mitigation of felony-murder); id. at 927 n.71 (traditionally, reliance
on official statements was no excuse because there was no defense of ignorance of law);
Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 319, 354 (1955)
(abandonment not traditionally recognized as defense to attempt charge).
92. The best general source on prior statutory law in this country is the official com-
mentaries for the Model Penal Code that are scheduled for publication by the American
Law Institute in 1979.
93. This experience is documented in the case of the statute considered in Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). That law allowed a person otherwise guilty of murder
to reduce his crime to manslaughter upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence of
"extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse."
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(l)(a) (McKinney 1975). This formulation was derived from a
substantially similar provision of the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(b)
(P.O.D. 1962). It defines a ground of mitigation far more expansive than the common
law doctrine of sudden heat of passion based on adequate provocation.
As stated in the Model Penal Code and as originally proposed to the New York
legislature, the "extreme emotional disturbance" defense involved no shift in the burden
of persuasion. The legislature balked, however, and refused to enact the more liberal rule
other than as an affirmative defense. See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 301, 347
N.E.2d 898, 906, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
For an analogous tradeoff, see State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977), where
the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the Model Penal Code version of a duress
defense but only with the burden of persuasion placed on the accused. Cf. Novosel v.
Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124 (N.H. 1978) (insanity as affirmative defense; overruling earlier
doctrine that sanity, once controverted, became substantive element of crime); State v.
Shoffner, 31 Wis. 2d 412, 143 N.W.2d 458 (1966) (defendant given option to plead in-
sanity as affirmative defense and accept burden of proof).
94. 397 U.S. at 364.
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A. Substantive Justice and the Limits of Procedure
The concern for substantive justice may be best revealed in the
various horror stories that accompany virtually every call for a pre-
dominately procedural requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Justice Powell's dissent in Patterson is illustrative. There he
speculates that a state might define murder as "mere physical con-
tact between the defendant and the victim leading to the victim's
death, but then set up an affirmative defense leaving it to the de-
fendant to prove that he acted without culpable mens rea."95 By this
device, the government "could be relieved altogether of responsibility
for proving anything regarding the defendant's state of mind."90
Professor Underwood voices a similar fear. She hypothesizes a leg-
islative collection of all homicide and assault offenses in a single
crime called "personal attack." Without a constitutional bar against
burden-shifting defenses, "a legislature could authorize conviction and
punishment for that crime on proof of a trivial assault, with the bur-
den on the defendant to establish the mitigating defenses of the vic-
tim's survival, his freedom from injury, or the defendant's lack of
intent to harm or injure."97
Other commentators98 and jurists9 have sounded the same theme.
Use of affirmative defenses may relieve the state of its duty to prove
a sufficient factual basis for punishment. By shifting to the defendant
the burden of establishing any mitigation or excuse, the legislature
may impose serious penalties for conduct that is, at worst, a trivial
wrong. When this fear is realized, the result is not simply an excep-
tion to the usual allocation of the burden of proof; it is a case of
substantive injustice.
Certainly, these results would be intolerable. It would be uncon-
scionable, as Justice Powell suggests, to base liability for murder on
proof of "mere physical contact" between defendant and deceased. And
Professor Underwood is undoubtedly correct in objecting to the im-
position of major felony sanctions following proof of a "trivial as-
sault." Both hypotheticals depict an enormous disparity between the
penalties authorized by law and any proven basis for subjecting an
individual citizen to censure and punishment. We all are outraged
if penal liability is imposed without any element of blameworthiness
95. 432 U.S. at 224 n.8.
96. Id. Justice Powell made essentially the same point in his opinion for the Court in
Mullaney. 421 U.S. at 699.
97. Underwood, supra note 15, at 1324.
98. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 188.
99. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952).
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or if sanctions bear no proportional relationship to the seriousness
of the crime.
The trouble lies in the unspoken assumption that excessive punish-
ment is somehow a product of shifting the burden of proof. In fact,
use of a burden-shifting defense or presumption does not necessarily
result in excessive punishment, nor does excessive punishment neces-
sarily involve reallocation of the burden of proof. Thus, to forbid
burden-shifting devices in order to reduce disparity between proven
fault and authorized penalties is a non sequitur. In point of fact, a
constitutional stricture against shifting the burden of proof would
not prevent the injustice of unwarranted or disproportionate crimi-
nal punishment. It would withdraw from legislative choice certain
procedural options, but it would not address the real evil of sub-
stantive disproportionality in the assignment of criminal penalties.
In this light, Professor Underwood's horror story is appropriately
revealed as an example of substantive injustice. By collecting all the
crimes of assault and homicide under the single rubric of "personal
attack," and by requiring the defendant to establish such mitigations
as the victim's survival, the state could predicate serious felony sanc-
tions on affirmative proof of nothing more than a "trivial assault."
The result would be a gross disparity between the punishment au-
thorized and any proven basis for inflicting it on the accused. But
the problem of excessive punishment is not cured by a rule against
shifting the burden of proof. The hypothetical legislature that would
assign the fact of the victim's survival to an affirmative defense to
a "personal attack" charge just as easily could eliminate the victim's
death as a grading factor for assaultive behavior. The state could
simply authorize serious sanctions for any physical assault, whether
fatal or trivial, and leave distinctions among cases to the sentencing
stage.' 00 This scheme involves no reallocation of the burden of proof,
but it is just as objectionable as Underwood's original hypothetical.
Both schemes would authorize major felony sanctions on proof of
nothing more than a trivial assault; both involve the infliction of
punishment grossly disproportionate to any proven blameworthiness
of the defendant.
Furthermore, no such disproportionality results from every shift
in the burden of proof. Consider the case of an affirmative defense
of renunciation for the crimes of attempt, conspiracy, and solicita-
100. We do not mean to suggest that there would not be serious constitutional ob-
jection to a law authorizing murder sanctions for a "trivial assault," but only that the
objection does not depend on a shift in the burden of proof. See pp. 1376-79 infra.
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tion. This defense would permit exculpation for the defendant who
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, as a result of
complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal intent, he avoided
or prevented commission of the crime that was the object of the
attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation. 1' 1 This defense involves a real-
location of the burden of proof, but it does not raise a problem of
excessive or unwarranted criminal punishment. The defendant's op-
portunity to exculpate himself by proving voluntary renunciation
in no way vitiates the fact that the state has established an adequate
basis for punishment by proving beyond a reasonable doubt the ele-
ments of attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation. Here there is simply
no parallel to Professor Underwood's fear of a murder sanction im-
posed on proof of a trivial assault.
In sum, not only would a rule against burden-shifting devices fore-
close many laudable features of penal-law reform; it would also fail
to resolve the underlying concern about unfairness to criminal de-
fendants. That is not surprising, for the kind of unfairness involved
in these hypotheticals does not flow from the reallocation of the
burden of proof, and it is not susceptible to solution by a rule barring
that practice. The problem is the excessive or unwarranted imposition
of criminal liability. This evil arises from the substantive content of
the penal law. It can be cured only by a rule that relates the require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the substantive content
of crime definition.
B. Burden of Proof and Substantive Justice
Only in the aftermath of Mullaney were the objections to a rigidly
procedural insistence on proof beyond a reasonable doubt widely
appreciated. 10 2 In particular, efforts to apply that decision led to
widespread recognition of its unhappy implications for legislative
101. An illustrative provision is N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.10(3) (McKinney 1975):
In any prosecution pursuant to section 110.00 for an attempt to commit a crime,
it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and
complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant avoided the commis-
sion of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort and, if mere abandon-
ment was insufficient to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirma-
tive steps which prevented the commission thereof.
Subsection (5) of the same statute elaborates this defense by specifying circumstances that
render a resulting renunciation of criminal purpose less than "voluntary and complete."
Id. § 40.10(5).
For a list of affirmative defenses of renunciation in the 33 American jurisdictions that
have recently enacted comprehensive revisions of their penal laws, see Appendix, pp.
1400-01 infra.
102. The only early hint of the problems to come was Christie & Pye, Presumptions
and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DuKE L.J. 919.
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law reform.'0 3 While at least one commentator seems content to
ignore that concern,' 0 4 other adherents to the Mullaney approach
have sought to redesign that doctrine to make it less of an obstacle
to substantive law reform. These efforts deserve attention, for they
are tentative first steps toward providing a sensible answer to the
question: proof of what beyond a reasonable doubt?
Perhaps the most obvious solution of this sort would be to construe
Winship to bar any shift in the burden of proof except those that
are ameliorative in impact.10 5 Because proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is a standard designed to protect criminal defendants, so the
argument might run, devices reallocating the burden of proof should
be condemned only when they work to the disadvantage of defendants.
When the burden-shifting defense or presumption involves an innova-
tion favorable to defendants, it should be tolerated because it is not
inconsistent with the policy underlying Winship.
This scheme would transform Mullaney from a narrowly proce-
dural reading of Winship to a test for evaluating substantive law. It
would shift the focus from a purely procedural emphasis on the bur-
den of proof to a rule requiring preliminary categorization of the
substantive content of the law in question. Although the direction
of this shift is commendable, the substantive standard suggested is
difficult to understand on its own terms and even harder to accept
as a statement of constitutional policy.
In the first place, it is no easy task to tell whether a particular
legal device is ameliorative or not. The question arises: as compared
with what? The answer must be that the notion of amelioration
refers to a direction of movement. Thus, a new rule of law is either
more or less advantageous to defendants than the rule that preceded
it. The problem, of course, is that rationalization of the substantive
law is seldom unidirectional. Reformulation of a criminal offense
is likely to involve a complex balance of factors and not simply
103. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305-07, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909-10, 383
N.Y.S.2d 573, 583 (1976), aff'd, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (Breitel, C.J., concurring); Allen, suPra
note 28; Low 9- Jeffries, supra note 38. No doubt this realization helped move the
Patterson Court to gut its recent precedent in favor of a return to legislative authority
over the burden of proof. See 432 U.S. at 207-11 & nn.10-11.
104. As has been noted, Professor Underwood has faith that putting legislatures to
hard choices will in fact prompt them to choose well. See Undervood, supra note 15, at
1318-19. Much the same view is expressed in Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 189.
The contention is dealt with at pp. 1354-56 supra.
105. A number of commentators have made suggestions of this sort. See, e.g., Osen-
baugh, supra note 40, at 459-67; 51 WASH L. Rav. 953, 964 (1976); cf. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr,
supra note 13, at 49; Fletcher, supra note 4, at 928-29 (when greater probability of
acquittal results from affirmative defense, shift of burden to defendant is legitimate).
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progress or regress along one dimension. In such a case, it would be
futile to ask whether one aspect of the revised offense was ameliora-
tive in character. Moreover, even an isolated change in the substan-
tive law is unlikely to work either to the advantage or disadvantage
of all defendants. It is more likely that a new substantive standard
would favor some defendants but not all.10 The foreseeable results
of trying to classify changes in the law as ameliorative or not are
doctrinal instability and hopeless confusion.
Additionally, a doctrine that makes a statute's validity turn on
whether it favors or disfavors criminal defendants reflects a crude
misunderstanding of constitutional policy. The Constitution is deeply
concerned with fairness to criminal defendants. But that concern is
quite different from asserting a constitutional bias against criminal
liability regardless of the merits. From the vantage point of the Con-
stitution, a change in law favorable to defendants is not necessarily
good, nor is an innovation favorable to the prosecution necessarily
bad. In short, determining the constitutionality of an affirmative
defense according to whether it makes conviction more or less likely
than under some prior regime seems to us unsound in principle, as
well as unworkable in practice.
A more interesting and potentially more fruitful refinement of
Mullaney was suggested by Justice Powell in his dissent in Patter-
son.10 7 There Justice Powell proposed a quasi-historical approach
that combined both procedural and substantive elements. On the
one hand, he stuck by an essentially procedural interpretation of
Winship. Indeed, he was especially clear in rejecting the notion that
a constitutional requirement to prove X beyond a reasonable doubt
should depend on the scope of legislative authority simply to regard
X as irrelevant. 08 Thus, he adhered to the view that Winship and
106. A good example is the law involved in Patterson. That statute was a modem
reformulation of the traditional rule of provocation; New York provided an affirmative
defense whenever the "defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." The statute further
provided that the reasonableness of such an explanation or excuse should "be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as
the defendant believed them to be." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(l)(a) (McKinney 1975)
(second-degree murder); id. § 125.27(2)(a) (first-degree murder). This reformulation marked
a considerable expansion in the coverage of the rule of provocation. The change would be
termed ameliorative with respect to those defendants previously excluded from, and now
brought within, the mitigation of murder to manslaughter. But the reform was not
similarly advantageous to those defendants who would have been covered by the narrower
doctrine of prior law. For them, the net effect of the change was clearly negative.
107. 432 U.S. at 216.
108. See id. at 228:
Winship and Mullaney specify only the procedure that is required when a State
elects to use [a given factor] as part of its substantive criminal law. They do not say
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Mullaney were exclusively procedural in consequence and not "out-
posts for policing the substantive boundaries of the criminal law."'10 9
On the other hand, Justice Powell suggested overtly substantive
criteria for deciding when to invoke the bar against burden-shifting
devices. In view of the likely impact on law reform, Justice Powell
declined to apply his reading of Winship to every aspect of the
definition of crime. Instead, he advanced a two-pronged test for iden-
tifying those issues for which burden-shifting should be disallowed:
The Due Process Clause requires that the prosecutor bear the
burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt only if the
factor at issue makes a substantial difference in punishment and
stigma. The requirement of course applies a fortiori if the factor
makes the difference between guilt and innocence. But a sub-
stantial difference in punishment alone is not enough. It must
also be shown that in the Anglo-American legal tradition the
factor in question historically has held that level of importance.
If either branch of the test is not met, then the legislature retains
its traditional authority over matters of proof.110
In other words, Winship should be construed to forbid reallocation
of the burden of proof, but only with respect to those issues that
make, and that historically have made, a substantial difference in
stigma and punishment.
This scheme is conceptually schizophrenic. It proposes a rule that
is entirely procedural in consequence-that is, a rule that would
disallow shifting the burden of proof even as it recognizes legislative
authority to redefine the substance of the law. Yet this ban against
burden-shifting devices would apply only when the substantive issue
involved makes, and in the Anglo-American legal tradition has made,
a substantial difference in punishment and stigma. In other contexts,
apparently, departures from the reasonable-doubt standard would be
allowed. The result of this rule would be a striking incongruence
that a State must elect to use it. For example, where a State has chosen to retain the
traditional distinction between murder and manslaughter .... the burden of persua-
sion must remain on the prosecution with respect to the distinguishing factor ....
But nothing in Mullaney or Winship precludes a State from abolishing the distinction
between murder and manslaughter and treating all unjustifiable homicide as murder.
109. Id. Somewhat surprisingly, at least one commentator had read Mullaney as hold-
ing that the rule of provocation was a constitutionally mandated ingredient of the law
of homicide. See Tushnet, supra note 44, at 783. Other commentators noted the pos-
sibility of so construing Mullaney, but declined to endorse that interpretation absent
more explicit support from the Court. Allen, supra note 28, at 284 n.82; Low & Jeffries,
supra note 38.
110. 432 U.S. at 226-27. This approach is criticized in Note, supra note 50, at 669-77
& 670 n.115.
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between the consequence of the doctrine (entirely procedural) and
the conditions governing its applicability (overtly substantive). We
know of no plausible rationale to bridge that discontinuity.
Moreover, even if one is prepared to ignore the conceptual dis-
unity of the Patterson dissent, the approach must be faulted for ex-
cessive reliance on history. Under Justice Powell's test, reallocation
of the burden of proof would be forbidden for any factor that makes
a substantial difference in punishment and stigma and that "histor-
ically has held that level of importance" in the Anglo-American legal
tradition.111 At least in the context of the penal law, we see little
reason to ascribe virtue to antiquity. As the multiplicity of traditional
theft offenses demonstrates, much of the common law of crimes
reflects the vagaries of historical evolution rather than any coherent
rendition of public policy." 2 Sometimes the common law was simply
confusing, as in the proliferation of highly elastic mens rea con-
cepts.113 In other respects, the problem was analytical unintelligibil-
ity, as in the common law insistence that mistake was something
different from, and unrelated to, the culpability required for com-
mission of an offense." 4 In still other aspects, the common law was
perversely and wrong-headedly logical, as in the requirement that
an accessory could be punished only if his principal had been caught,
111. 432 U.S. at 226.
112. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE art. 206, app. A at 101-09 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1953); W. LAFAvE & A. Scow, suPra note 13, at 618-77.
113. The elasticity and indeterminacy of traditional specifications of mens rea is
illustrated wonderfully by the case of Regina v. Cunningham, 41 Crim. App. 155 (1957).
Cf. I NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
118-20 (1970) (as of 1970, federal penal statutes specified mental states required by various
offenses by "staggering array" of 78 different words and phrases).
114. The idea that mistake is something unrelated to the culpability required for
commission of the offense is not merely a misconception; it is an analytical impossibility.
Yet, surprisingly, it persists in some quarters. Thus, for example, one recent treatise deals
with ignorance or mistake of fact as a question separate from mens rea and purports to
state a general rule governing the effect of such ignorance or mistake:
It may be stated as a general rule (subject, however, to exceptions in certain cases)
that mistake of fact will disprove a criminal charge if the mistaken belief is (a)
honestly entertained, (b) based upon reasonable grounds and (c) of such a nature
that the conduct would have been lawful and proper had the facts been as they were
reasonably supposed to be.
R. PERKINS, supra note 91, at 939-40 (footnotes omitted). The trouble is that the general
specification that the mistake must be reasonable implicitly allows criminal conviction on
proof of negligence, and penal liability based on negligence is plainly the exception rather
than the rule. The correct rule is that, although only a reasonable mistake would negate
a culpability of negligence, any honest mistake, no matter how unreasonable, would
negate liability for a crime requiring knowledge. As Glanville Williams put it: "It is im-
possible to assert that a crime requiring intention or recklessness can be committed al-
though the accused laboured under a mistake that negatived the requisite intention or
recklessness. Such an assertion carries its own refutation." G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW
137 (1953); see Woozley, Negligence and Ignorance, 53 PHILOSOPHY 293 (1978).
1363
The Yale Law Journal
tried, and convicted."15 Further, even the wisest and most considered
judgments of an eighteenth-century English court may lack relevance
in twentieth-century America. Thus, at least by modern lights, many
prominent aspects of the common law tradition of crime definition
seem unfortunate models for modern lawmaking.
The resort to an assumed historical benchmark is especially inap-
propriate now, for it comes in the midst of the greatest surge of
penal law reform that this country has ever known. Beginning with
the promulgation of the Model Penal Code in 1962, fifty American
jurisdictions have undertaken to recodify their penal laws; those
efforts have reached fruition in thirty-three jurisdictions and are still
pending in many more.116 In virtually every case, the codes depart from
much of the common law legacy in favor of new constructs and for-
mulations, many of them derived from the Model Penal Code and
its principal progeny. 17 It would be particularly unfortunate to in-
ject into this current of legislative reform and innovation a consti-
tutional doctrine exalting the traditional law of crimes and fixing
its content as a normative standard for constitutional adjudication.
Although history may serve as a starting point for inquiry into what
is fundamental in the criminal law, it cannot be more than that.
Of necessity, the states and the courts have begun to turn to general
principles derived from concepts of fairness and the purposes of the
criminal law to impose substantive limits on the legislative power to
define crime and prescribe punishment.
On this critical goal, the opinions of dissent and majority in Pat-
terson seem to converge. As Mr. Justice White noted in his opinion
for the Court, "there are obviously constitutional limits beyond
which the States may not go" in redefining crime to shift the bur-
den of proof."" Both the context of that statement and the result in
the case make clear that the limits envisioned by the Patterson ma-
jority are substantive in nature. Thus, a legislature may not, for ex-
ample, simply "'declare an individual guilty . . .of a crime,' ,119 nor
115. See W. LAFAvE S. A. ScoTr, supra note 13, at 495-500; R. PmRuNs, supra note 91,
at 669-76.
116. Thirty-three jurisdictions have enacted comprehensively revised penal codes. See
note 83 supra. The American Law Institute reports that some form of penal-law codifica-
tion is under way in California, the District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, and on the federal
level, and that at one time or another similar efforts have been undertaken in seven other
jurisdictions. REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ALI ANN. REP. (forthcoming 1979).
117. The impact of the Model Penal Code in the substantive criminal law will be
covered in exhaustive detail in the American Law Institute's forthcoming commentaries
to the Proposed Official Draft.
118. 432 U.S. at 210.
119. Id. (quoting McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916)).
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may it " 'create a presumption of the existence of all the facts essen-
tial to guilt.' ",120 The fatal defect in these two statutes, of course,
would not be an isolated shift in the burden of proof. It would be,
rather, that the state has inflicted criminal punishment without es-
tablishing beyond a reasonable doubt an adequate factual basis for
imposing the authorized penalties. The underlying concept is that
of a constitutional floor for the substantive criminal law, that is, a
notion of prerequisites essential for imposing liability along with a
required proportionate relationship between the wrong done and
the punishment authorized. It is toward this conception of the mean-
ing of Winship that both the Patterson majority and dissent appear
to be moving.
III. A Constitutional Basis for the Scope of Winship
Restricting Winship's application to the elements of an offense
would expose the reasonable-doubt standard to the vagaries of the
language adopted in state statutes; on this basis, Winship would
emerge as an exercise in formalism. Alternatively, converting Win-
ship to a rigid rule of procedure would have the illogical result that
a state would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt what-
ever it chose to consider, but it would have no proof requirements
at all for what it chose to ignore. Efforts to derive a substantive basis
for applying the reasonable-doubt requirement strike out in the right
direction, but the chief proposals to date-looking to ameliorative ef-
fects or to common law definitions of crimes-are inadequate and
unworkable.
In our view, the only sensible construction of Winship is one that
demands, as an essential of due process, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of facts sufficient to justify penalties of the sort contemplated.
In other words, Winship should be read to assert a constitutional
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of a constitutionally
adequate basis for imposing the punishment authorized. This read-
ing of the case would avoid extending a constitutional doctrine be-
yond the scope of any coherent justification for it. It would also
avoid the illogical and potentially retrogressive implications of a
purely procedural insistence on the reasonable-doubt standard. Per-
haps most importantly, this interpretation of the scope of Winship
would serve the essential purpose of the reasonable-doubt require-
ment in the only meaningful way possible-that is, by explicit rec-
120. 432 U.S. at 210 (quoting Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943)).
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ognition of the interaction between a constitutional rule governing
the burden of proof and residual legislative authority over the defi-
nition of crimes and prescription of punishments. Given this alloca-
tion of institutional responsibilities, a constitutional standard designed
to bias factfinding in favor of the innocent can be effective only if
it incorporates a constitutional conception of what innocence is.
As always, there is a problem. The task of identifying constitu-
tional minima for the law of crimes is analytically unavoidable, but
it is also more than a little forbidding. At least in terms of judicial
exposition, the existence of constitutional constraints on the sub-
stantive criminal law is largely terra incognita. Indeed, one suspects
that some of the reluctance to embrace a substantive interpretation
of Winship stems not so much from any analytical objection to that
approach as from a vague sense of uncertainty as to how to proceed.
It may be useful, therefore, to sketch the background of this ques-
tion and to outline, albeit in highly tentative terms, the Constitu-
tion's minimum requirements for the substantive criminal law. No
attempt is made here to do more than to suggest a direction of
analysis, but it is hoped that the importance of that small step will
be revealed by the discussion of illustrative problems at the end of
this section.
A. Historical Neglect of Constitutional Requirements for
the Substantive Criminal Law
The Supreme Court has devoted considerable attention to issues
of procedural justice12 1 and, to a lesser extent, to the sufficiency and
reliability of the evidence on which conviction is based.' 2 2 Yet even
121. Indeed, no subject occupies a more prominent place in recent volumes of the
United States Reports than criminal procedure. Over the years, the Supreme Court has
stated constitutional standards for virtually every aspect of the criminal justice process,
whether state or federal. In most instances, the Court's decisions spring from relatively
specific procedural protections defined in the Bill of Rights, such as the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Other procedural
safeguards have been found within the spacious contours of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' guarantee of due process of law. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Most of these decisions are concerned with preserving individual liberty by restraining
various kinds of overreaching by the state.
122. Perhaps the best illustration of a constitutional concern with the reliability of
evidence and with its impact upon substantive justice is Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973). In that case the Court reversed a murder conviction because otherwise
valid state hearsay rules barred introduction of testimony concerning confessions of guilt
by someone other than the accused. The Court noted the spontaneity of the confessions,
the existence of corroborative evidence, and the against-interest character of the state-
ments as factors in favor of crediting the testimony and held that a conviction based on
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as the Supreme Court was fashioning an entire body of federal con-
stitutional law on criminal procedure, it remained reluctant to re-
strict legislative authority over the substantive definition of crime.
With few, though important, exceptions, 123 the Court's opinions in
the field of substantive criminal law have been confined to the con-
struction of federal statutes, and the states have remained largely
free to define the penal law as they see fit. This state of affairs
prompted Professor Henry Hart to ask: "What sense does it make
to insist upon procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if any-
thing whatever can be made a crime in the first place?"'124 The
complaint may be overstated, but it is not unfounded. There exists
today, as there has for many years, a decided imbalance in the de-
velopment of constitutional doctrine. The result is an elaborate body
of law governing procedural rights and a dearth of constitutional
authority on the minimal conditions of substantive justice.
Two factors may explain at least in part this historic imbalance.
The first is the decline and disgrace of substantive due process, the
doctrine that is perhaps the most immediately relevant to concerns
for substantive fairness in crime definition. The excesses to which
that doctrine had been put led to a reaction of equal force.12 5 There
followed a long eclipse of substantive due process from the favor of
the Court and commentators. The result was to leave the Court and
the bar without any familiar doctrinal basis for prescribing the mini-
mal content of the law of crimes. Procedural decisions, on the other
hand, could be explained by reference to the explicitly procedural
provisions of the Bill of Rights, thereby avoiding the concept of sub-
stantive due process and the special burden of justifying a return to
that approach.
A second factor contributing to neglect of substantive law was the
traditional conception of the law of crimes as essentially static and
unchanging, determined more by Anglo-Saxon inheritance than by
the exclusion of such testimony violated due process. Id. at 300-02; see Westen, Con-
frontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91
HARV. L. REv. 567 (1978).
123. Of course, the scope of the criminal law is subject to substantive limits imposed
by special constitutional protections for certain kinds of activity. The First Amendment
is especially notable in this regard, but there are also instances of personal autonomy
that have been afforded constitutional protection. E.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). These incidental limits
imposed on the criminal law by virtue of special constitutional protection for certain
activities do not, however, contribute much to the notion of minimal constitutional
standards applicable to crime definition generally.
124. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 401, 431 (1958).
125. See generally McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34.
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any fresh perception of public policy, and quite unlikely to be sub-
ject to radical legislative innovation. Theoretically, of course, every-
one recognized the authority of legislatures to redefine crimes, but
in practice most legislative enactments simply memorialized the com-
mon law. Indeed, the chief outlet of legislative activity was not the
reform of existing law but the haphazard addition of new offenses
to fill some real or imagined gap in coverage. Most of the detail of
existing doctrine was judicial in origin and apt to change, if at all,
only in the incremental fashion of judicial construction. The per-
ception of common ancestry and continuity of tradition in the law
of crimes dominated any thought of the potential for diversity and
change. To be sure, the law differed from state to state, but every
jurisdiction played variations on a theme by Coke, Blackstone, and
Stephen. In short, the basic content of the penal law was accepted
as a given. In light of that background, it is scarcely surprising that
no one had much occasion to worry about the need for constitutional
restraints on the definition of crime.
Today these inhibitions have diminished. Substantive due process
has experienced a revival among Supreme Court justices and com-
mentators. 126 The lesson now drawn from earlier excesses is not re-
jection of the concept but acceptance with "caution and restraint."'127
Thus, the way is now open for explicit recognition of at least certain
central principles of substantive justice as part of that substantive
"liberty" specially protected against state interference by the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process of law.
Moreover, another doctrinal avenue has become available to per-
mit specification of constitutional minima for the law of crimes. In
recent years the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishment has been construed to ban not only punishments
126. The most elaborate judicial discussion of this development occurs in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). Justice Powell announced the judgment
of the Court in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun. This
opinion expressly relies on the substantive content of the due process clause as the basis
for invalidating the law in question. Three dissenting Justices also seemed to accept the
validity of substantive due process, even though they disagreed with the plurality's ap-
plication of that doctrine in the case at hand. See id. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., joined by
Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 541-51 (White, J., dissenting). The same point was also
explicitly recognized in Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976), both in Justice Rehnquist's
opinion for the Court, id. at 244, and in the dissenting opinion authored by Justice
Marshall and joined by Justice Brennan, id at 250-51.
Recent decisions now generally conceded to have involved substantive due process also
include Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 494 (1977), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
127. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.).
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that are bizarre but also punishments that are unwarranted. 128 This
constitutional source may well be fruitful in articulating the con-
cept of constitutionally mandated prerequisites for the imposition
of criminal liability. A mere assertion of possible doctrinal support
does not make the case for recognition of constitutional restraints
on the definition of crimes. But it is important to note that the
lack of doctrinal opportunity that long thwarted any attempt to speci-
fy constitutional minima for the substantive law has now been twice
remedied.
The passage of time has also laid to rest the outdated perception
of an essentially static law of crimes. The reform movement begun
by the Model Penal Code has swept away any excuse for ignoring
the crucial role of legislative control over the substance of the penal
law. Today, at least, it is inescapably apparent that the definition of
a crime is whatever the legislature chooses to specify as sufficient for
criminal liability. This recognition should confirm the need for
some limitation of the power to define crimes if our commitment
to individual liberty and substantive justice is to be made meaningful.
Despite these shifts in doctrine and attitude, to date the Court
has made only sporadic efforts to spell out constitutional minima
for the imposition of criminal liability. To some extent, this lack
of development simply reflects a lack of pressure from the docket.
The Court does not invent opportunities to make constitutional pro-
nouncements but awaits, quite properly, the necessity of a case. Fur-
ther, defense lawyers have been more inclined to repeat the familiar
claims of procedural error, rather than to venture into the less certain
terrain of constitutional restraints on the definition of crime.
There is, however, reason to expect fresh activity in this area. Es-
pecially now, when traditional reliance on a historical, common law
heritage defining the content and scope of criminal liability has been
replaced by model legislation and a flurry of state legislative reforms,
128. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (plurality opinion); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judgment of Court); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962); United States v. Wardlaw, 576 F.2d 932, 937 (1st Cir. 1978); Carmona
v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 408-09 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 874 (1979); Rummel
v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3760 (May 21, 1979) (No.
78-6386); Roberts v. Collins, 544 F.2d 168 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 973 (1977);
Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 423 U.S. 993 (1975);
Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974); In re Lynch,
8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1973); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich.
167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 332 N.E.2d 338, 371 N.Y.S.2d
471, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 950 (1975). See generally Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited
Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838 (1972).
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challenges to the constitutionality of defenses and presumptions will
continue to arise. Resolving those issues appropriately will require
consideration of the constitutionally essential ingredients of substan-
tive justice. Comprehensive exposition of that subject far exceeds the
ambition of this piece. Our goal here is only to indicate the proper
analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of defenses
and presumptions in the criminal law. Even for that limited purpose,
however, it may be useful to recount enough of the settled under-
standing of the essentials of substantive justice to demonstrate the
analytic utility of the substantive interpretation of Winship.
B. Constitutional Minima for the Criminal Law
Fortunately, we are not without instruction in seeking to identify
the constitutional minima for criminal punishment. The chief fea-
tures of that landscape are described, albeit only in broad outline,
by the convergence of criminal law doctrine and a handful of ap-
plicable constitutional precedents. As used here, "criminal law doc-
trine" refers not to the traditional definitions of specific offenses
but rather to the conceptual structure of crime definition. This struc-
ture has been distilled from the common law tradition by generations
of scholars and judges. It provides the conceptual basis for modern
legislative reforms of the penal law. As commonly understood, crim-
inal law doctrine postulates two essential components of crime defi-
nition and a proportionate relationship between the penalty author-
ized and the wrong done.
1. Actus Reus
The first essential component is the requirement of an act. Penal
liability may not be imposed for mere intention, but is reserved for
behavior. Thus, the starting point for any definition of crime is the
statement of proscribed conduct, the actus reus of the offense. The
state is generally free to define the actus reus as it will, but it may
not dispense with the requirement of conduct as a prerequisite of
criminal liability. The conduct specified need not be affirmative;
it may consist of an act or a failure to act. It may even consist of
possession-a relationship created by an act of acquisition and con-
tinued by a failure to divest. But because of the requirement of
conduct as an essential component of crime definition, the state
may not punish the bare desire to do wrong, nor may it premise
liability on a mere personal characteristic or status.
The act requirement is so fundamental to our understanding of the
penal law that it is not often called into question or disregarded by
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legislative enactment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has had oc-
casion to consider the act requirement, and has held that conduct-
some act, omission, or possession committed personally by the accused
-is a constitutionally required element of crime definition. 29 It is
true, of course, that the act requirement, standing alone, does not
ensure a rational or humane penal law. But it is a critical doctrinal
construct, deeply embedded in the Anglo-American concept of just
punishment, and its acceptance as constitutional mandate marks the
starting point for analysis of a constitutional criminal law.130
2. Mens .Rea
The other essential of crime definition is culpability. To be cul-
pable, the actor must have a mental attitude, or mens rea, indicative
of blameworthiness. Typically, this means that he must have a speci-
129. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson the Supreme Court held
violative of the Eighth Amendment a law against being addicted to the use of narcotics.
The penalty prescribed, imprisonment for 90 days, was conventional and moderate, but
the Court concluded that it would be cruel and unusual to impose any criminal punish-
ment for the status of addiction. Id. at 667. Robinson therefore established the traditional
requirement of an act as a constitutional prerequisite of criminal liability.
Many observers read the case even more broadly to bar penal liability when the actor's
conduct could not meaningfully be described as "voluntary." See Note, The Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635, 648-51
(1966). Followed to its logical conclusion, this notion would cast a very long shadow. If an
addict could not be punished for the involuntary condition of addiction, he should also be
immune from punishment for the related acts of use, possession, and purchase of narcotics,
and perhaps even for unrelated crimes committed to finance his habit. The lack of dis-
cernible limits to a constitutional requirement of voluntariness prompted the Court in
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), to withdraw from the broader implications of
Robinson. Specifically, the Powell Court held that it would not be unconstitutional to
convict a chronic alcoholic of public drunkenness. Id. at 532. In reaching that conclusion,
the plurality made clear that it construed Robinson not as a broad requirement of "volun-
tariness" but as a narrower insistence on conduct as an essential ingredient of crime
definition. Id. at 533 (Marshall, J., announcing judgment of Court). To that extent, at
least, Powell left Robinson intact, and so it remains to this day.
130. The significance of the act requirement should not be understated. First, it serves
a critical evidentiary function in corroborating other proof going to the existence of evil
intent. The inevitable risk of error in assessing mental attitude is intolerably great when
state of mind is not anchored in evidence of objectively demonstrable conduct. Thus,
proof of conduct is necessary to establish culpability.
Second, the act requirement serves an equally important function in differentiating
daydreams from fixed intentions. Mental attitude is not only difficult to demonstrate; it
is also evanescent, fluid, and various. When there is no real prospect that evil thought
will be translated into evil deed, there is no legitimate occasion for punishment. The
act requirement therefore precludes criminal penalty for fantasy, wish, or conjecture. It
insists that antisocial thought be manifest in behavior tending toward the harm ultimately
feared. Thus, proof of conduct is necessary to establish dangerousness as well as cul-
pability. Finally, the act requirement preserves the liberty of the individual citizen by
constraining penal liability within a tolerable sphere. It states a limit on the coercive
power of the state and marks a boundary of individual accountability to the collective
will. As Herbert Packer put the point, the act requirement provides a locus poenitentiae
to enable the law-abiding citizen to avoid criminal liability. H. PACKER, THE LimiTs OF
THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 73-75 (1968). See generally G. Wxr-TAms, supra note 114, at 1-28.
1371
The Yale Law Journal
fied state of mind with respect to the conduct proscribed by the
offense.1' 1
Most modem authorities accept the formulation of mens rea ad-
vanced by Professor Herbert Wechsler in the Model Penal Code.13 2
He concluded that state of mind can usefully be described in four
necessary and sufficient categories: (1) "purpose," denoting the actor's
conscious objective or desire; (2) "knowledge," meaning awareness;
(3) "recklessness," referring to conscious creation of risk; and (4)
"negligence," indicating inadvertent risk creation. These categories
comprise a hierarchy of culpability ranging from carelessness to
conscious disregard of risk to actual awareness to intention.
Some scholars have questioned the sufficiency of negligence, that
is, failure to perceive a risk of which the actor should have been
aware, as a ground for imposing penal liability. 133 Most authorities,
however, accept negligence as a minimally sufficient basis of guilt,
at least in some cases.' 34 Legislatures apparently agree, for American
jurisdictions generally punish negligent homicide as a criminal of-
fense.135 More commonly, however, criminal liability is confined to
some variety of conscious wrongdoing. Thus, the minimum culpa-
bility most widely found in the penal law is recklessness-a require-
ment of conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the actor is doing that which the law forbids.13 Negligence as
an occasion for penal sanctions tends to be reserved for conduct that
131. The language traditionally used to specify the mental element required for a crime
is regrettably elastic. A word such as "willfully" has invited confusion. Compare Bishop
v. United States, 455 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 346 (1973) and Abdul v.
United States, 254 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1958) with United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240
(3d Cir. 1966) (different meanings attributed to "willfully" used in tax-fraud offenses
defined by I.R.C. §§ 7206, 7207).
The various assertions of difference between "general" and "specific" intent continue
to bedevil the penal law. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); People v.
Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02,
Comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
132. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (P.O.D. 1962).
133. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 401 (1971); Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded From Penal
Liability, 63 COLUm. L. REV. 632 (1963). Compare G. WLLAMS, supra note 114, at 82-100
with H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136-57 (1968) (discussing imposition of
criminal punishment for negligence).
134. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 124, at 416-17; WVechsler & Michael, supra note 35, at
749-51; Woozley, supra note 114. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comment 3
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
135. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.4, Comment 1 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959)
(citing statutes); Riesenfeld, Negligent Homicide-A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 25
CALiF. L. RFv. 1 (1936).
136. For a more elaborate and precise definition of the concept of recklessness, see
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (P.O.D. 1962).
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the law-abiding citizen would be especially anxious to avoid-e.g.,
causing the death of another.
The remaining possibility is to impose liability without fault.
The paradigm case of liability without fault is a penal statute that
punishes conduct without reference to any state of mind indicative
of blameworthiness. For example, a law might condemn as criminal
the sale of impure food without requiring that the actor know of
the impurity or even that he be aware of facts giving reason to know.
Liability with respect to the impurity would be strict-that is, it
would not depend on proof of any mental attitude with respect to
that element of the offense. Thus, the actor could be convicted even
though he believed his products to be pure and had done all that
could have been done to ensure purity.13 7
Punishment on this basis is not uncommon in this country. Gen-
erally, however, liability without fault is confined to so-called "regu-
latory" or "public welfare" offenses. 138 The distinguishing charac-
teristics of these offenses are said to be that they result from neglect
rather than from positive aggression or invasion of the rights of
others, that they often inflict no immediate injury to persons or
property but merely create the risk thereof, that they carry relatively
minor penalties, and that their violation does not cause grave dam-
age to the reputation of the offender. 130  Some have suggested that
these laws should be viewed as criminal in form only and therefore
removed from the usual restraints placed on the use of the penal
law.' 40 Even in this context, however, judicial and academic accep-
tance of liability without fault has not been enthusiastic. 141 And with
137. It is worth emphasizing that dispensing with proof of culpability for one aspect
of an offense often involves no hint of injustice. Indeed, there may be no criminal offense
that requires fault with respect to every element of the actus reus. The law of perjury, for
example, punishes one who makes a material false statement under oath in an official pro-
ceeding. See, e.g., id. § 241.1(1). Culpability is required for the falsity of the sworn state-
ment but not for its materiality to the proceeding at hand. The result is strict liability with
respect to materiality, but no one would suggest that the law of perjury imposes liability
without fault. A sufficient basis for punishment is shown by proof of a knowing falsehood
under oath without regard to whether the actor knew or should have known of the
materiality of his lie.
On the other hand, it is also true that liability without fault may exist even though the
offense includes a technical requirement of mens rea. The critical element is that the law
require state of mind with respect to facts indicative of blameworthiness.
138. See generally Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUJM. L. REv. 55 (1933).
139. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1952).
140. Tenement House Dep't v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168-69, 109 N.E. 88, 90 (1915)
(Cardozo, J.); see J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 111-13 (1970).
141. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959); Sweet v.
Parsley [1970] A.C. 132 (H.L.); Hart, supra note 124, at 422-25; Wechsler, The Challenge
of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1097, 1109 (1952).
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respect to traditional crimes, it is a widely accepted normative prin-
ciple that conviction should not be had without proof of fault. 142 At
least when the offense carries serious sanctions and the stigma of
official condemnation, liability should be reserved for persons whose
blameworthiness has been established. Otherwise, punishment lacks
a moral basis, and conviction is unjust. Thus, a requirement of some
mens rea indicative of moral fault should be regarded as the second
essential ingredient of crime definition.
The requirement of culpability is not much disputed among those
who concern themselves with the theoretical justifications for crim-
inal punishment. 43 Indeed, the longevity and importance of this com-
ponent of crime definition has received eloquent testimonials from the
Supreme Court..44 Constitutional acceptance of a requirement of cul-
pability, however, is at best uncertain.
In fact, the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Dotter-
weich145 and United States v. Park46 are widely understood to have
sanctioned the abandonment of mens rea in the definition of crime.
There are reasons, however, to regard the conventional reading of
these cases as overstatement. The principal question in Dotterweich
was an issue of statutory construction of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act. 47 The constitutional point was passed over in a
markedly brief and casual discussion, authorizing the imposition of
liability upon "a person otherwise innocent but standing in a re-
sponsible relation to a public danger."' 48
142. See Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 463, 525-26
(1967); Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal
Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REv. 322 (1966); Hart, supra note 124; Hippard, The Un-
constitutionality of Criminal Liability Without Fault: An Argument for a Constitutional
Doctrine of Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REv. 1039 (1973); Laylin & Tuttle, Due Process and
Punishment, 20 MICH. L. REv. 614 (1922); Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42
MINN. L. REV. 1043, 1101-04 (1958); Packer, The Aims of the Criminal Process Revisited:
A Plea for a New Look at "Substantive Due Process," 44 S. CAL. L. Rv. 490 (1971);
Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 107 [hereinafter cited as
Packer, Mens Rea]; Scott, Constitutional Limitations on Substantive Criminal Law, 29
RocKy MTN. L. REv. 275 (1957).
143. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 124; Hippard, supra note 142.
144. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). The case involved construc-
tion of a federal statute and thus does not implicate directly the constitutional status of
the requirement of culpability. The Morissette Court, however, did go out of its way to
emphasize the importance of mens rea as a prerequisite to penal liability and suggested,
at least, that statutes dispensing with culpability for traditional criminal offenses would
impair the constitutional protections accorded to defendants. Id. at 260-63. See gen-
erally Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 142, at 122-26 (discussing dictum on importance of
mens lea).
145. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
146. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
147. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1976).
148. The following is the Court's discussion in its entirety:
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based on the now familiar type
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The language of "responsible relation" arose again in United
States v. Park. 49 In a decision under the same statute, the Court again
purported to accept criminal conviction without proof of mens rea,
but it also discussed "responsible relation" in a way that came close
to requiring negligence.150 Justice Stewart, writing for himself and
for Justices Marshall and Powell, so construed the majority opinion
and dissented from the result only because he concluded that the trial
judge's instructions did not meet the standards for "responsibility" set
out in the Court's decision.151
Thus, although Dotterweich and Park may be read as indicative
of the Court's willingness to tolerate abandonment of mens rea in
some circumstances, neither constitutes an unequivocal acceptance
of penal liability without fault. Dotterweich is notable for the off-
hand manner in which the issue is treated, 152 and Park is notable for
the ambiguity surrounding the Court's reconsideration of the ques-
tion.1 3 Perhaps most important of all, neither Dotterweich nor Park
involved a traditional crime carrying the societal stigma usually as-
sociated with criminal conviction, and neither case resulted in a sen-
tence of imprisonment. Each defendant was found guilty of an offense
the history and subject matter of which suggest the "regulatory"
classification,'0 and each was subjected only to nominal fines. 55 As
justifications for these decisions, these considerations may or may not
be thought persuasive. They are, however, certainly adequate to de-
bunk the erroneous notion that Dotterweich and Park mark unquali-
fied constitutional acceptance of criminality without culpability. 56
of legislation whereby penalties serve as an effective means of regulation. Such
legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-aware-
ness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of
acting at hazard upon a person othervise innocent but standing in a responsible rela-
tion to a public danger.
320 U.S. at 280-81.
149. 421 U.S. at 671-72.
150. Id. at 672-74.
151. Id. at 678-79.
152. See Packer, Mens Rea, supira note 142, at 119.
153. Indeed, although Park is generally understood as a qualified affirmation of
Dotterweich at least one commentator has found in Park an implicit overruling of the
prior decision. Tushnet, supra note 44, at 794-95.
154. See p. 1373 supra.
155. Dotterweich was fined $500 and sentenced to 60 days' probation. United States v.
Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131 F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd sub nom. United States v.
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Park was fined $250. 421 U.S. at 666.
156. The Court's willingness to tolerate imposition of liability without fault may be
growing more selective. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction under a municipal ordinance requiring convicted felons in Los
Angeles to register with the police. Although not explained on this ground, the decision
may be understood as a rejection of liability without fault. The opinion criticized the
ordinance for punishing an omission, the "mere failure to register," rather than some
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Based on the precedents, therefore, the matter remains unsettled.
As a question of principle, however, there can be little doubt of the
morally objectionable character of liability without fault or of its
inconsistency with the traditional Anglo-American concept of fair-
ness to the individual. 157 At least when nonregulatory crimes are
concerned, 158 penal liability should be limited to cases in which it
is shown that the actor has departed from that which the prototypical
law-abiding citizen would have done in the actor's situation. Other-
wise, criminal conviction is a deprivation of individual liberty with-
out basis in proof of personal fault.
3. Proportionality
The third fundamental constraint on the imposition of penal sanc-
tions is the principle of proportionality. Even when the essential
prerequisites of criminal liability are established, there must be some
limit on the severity of authorized punishment.'59 Otherwise, there
is potential for barbaric excess in the infliction of serious penalties
for trivial misconduct. There is, of course, no way to calculate exact
relationships between wrong done and punishment earned, for the
perception of good and bad and harm and blame flows from nor-
mative judgments that defy precise quantification. Nonetheless, a
affirmative misconduct. Id. at 228. The opinion also found constitutional defect in the
government's failure to give Lambert notice of her duty to register. Id.
Neither of these rationales sufficiently explains the decision. The Court has not registered
doubts about the common use of criminal punishment for omissions in other contexts,
and there seems to be no reason to regard liability based on omission as presumptively
objectionable. See generally Hughes, Criminal Omissions, 67 YALE L.J. 590 (1958). More-
over, the notion that Lambert stands for a constitutional requirement of notice of il-
legality is also defective. As the dissenters correctly pointed out, 355 U.S. at 230 (Frank-
furter, Harlan, and Whittaker, JJ., dissenting), the proposition proves too much. Penal
laws are everywhere enforced without any special effort to apprise the populace of their
content and certainly without individual notice of the sort discussed in Lambert.
What was distinctive about Lambert was not punishment of an omission or the lack of
actual notice of the requirements of law, but instead the law's assignment of criminal
penalties to conduct that was not blameworthy. There was no indication that the proto-
typical law-abiding citizen, if placed in Lambert's situation, would have behaved other-
wise. Therefore, Lambert may well be explained as a rejection of liability without fault,
even though the case is not explicitly disposed of on that ground.
157. See generally J. BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 399-402 (J. Bowring ed. Edinburgh 1843); H.L.A. HART, supra note 133, at 13-24.
158. Whatever one's opinion on strict liability in the regulatory context, it should be
clear that strict liability in other contexts is objectionable in principle.
159. The following analysis adopts the conventional approach of judging the outer
limit of the permissible severity of punishment. The emphasis on the maximum
authorized penalty rather than on that actually imposed may well deserve closer examina-
tion, but it will be accepted here as part of the general analysis accorded to the con-
stitutional minima of substantive criminal law.
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just penal law must reflect some rough sense of proportion in the
assignment of sanctions.
It is increasingly clear that this principle of proportionality rises
to the level of a constitutional stricture. A growing body of case law,
starting with United States v. Weems,160 confirms that the Eighth
Amendment bar to cruel and unusual punishment relates not only
to the nature of the penalty imposed but also to the severity of pun-
ishment relative to the gravity of the underlying offense. In Weems,
the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a sentence of fifteen years'
hard labor at least in part because it violated the "precept of justice
that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to offense."' 6'1 In the course of its opinion, the Court had occasion
to approve and adopt Justice Field's earlier observation that the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment "was directed, not
only against punishments which inflict torture, 'but against all pun-
ishments which by their excessive length or severity are greatly dis-
proportioned to the offenses charged.' ",162
The proportionality principle established by Weems remained for
many years unquestioned but not explicitly used.1 63 Express Supreme
160. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Weems was a disbursing officer in the Philippine Coast Guard.
He was sentenced to 15 years' hard labor for certain minor falsifications that apparently
harmed no one. The statute in question required neither an intent to defraud nor any
objective of personal gain. The accused challenged the sentence as cruel and unusual
punishment under the applicable provision of the Philippine bill of rights; the Supreme
Court ruled that the content of that guarantee should be determined by reference to the
parallel provision of the United States Constitution and based its decision on an extensive
review of American authorities and precedents. Id. at 366-75.
161. Id. at 367.
162. Id. at 371 (quoting O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892) (Field, J., dis-
senting)).
163. On a number of occasions, however, the Weems principle has elicited approving
references from various justices. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968)
(plurality opinion of Marshall, J.); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 & n.32 (1958) (plurality
opinion of Warren, C.J.); Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 435 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The Court disallowed a disproportionate sentence but relied on a different explanation
in Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). The defendant in Specht was convicted of
indecent liberties. That offense normally carried a maximum term of 10 years' imprison-
ment, but the defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of one year to life under
a special sex-offender statute. Sentencing under the sex-offender statute, as distinct from
conviction of the underlying offense, was not based on an adversary proceeding, and
the defendant challenged the result on that ground. The Court accepted that argument
and reversed the conviction, even while announcing continued adherence to precedents
holding that sentencing need not be based on such proceedings. Professor Low has
persuasively analyzed Specht as an instance of unconstitutionally disproportionate punish-
ment. Low, Special Offender Sentencing, 8 Am. Cram. L.Q. 70, 74-75 (1970). Had the
underlying crime been forcible rape rather than the trivial offense of indecent liberties,
he suggested, the case would probably have come out the other way. Id. at 75. Instead
of turning on defective procedures, the decision marks outer limits on the severity of
punishment for a specific offense.
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Court reliance on the proportionality concept returned with the
death-penalty litigation. Justices on both sides of that recurring dis-
pute have agreed that the Eighth Amendment incorporates the pro-
portionality principle.0 4 The Court has not had occasion to invoke
the principle of proportionality outside the context of capital pun-
ishment. 16 The lower courts, however, have developed a growing
body of case law applying proportionality in other areas. A typical
illustration is Hart v. Coiner,"", in which the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit invoked the proportionality principle to invali-
date a mandatory life sentence imposed under a recidivist statute.
The underlying offenses involved writing a bad check for $50, trans-
porting across state lines a forged check for $140, and perjury. The
court found the life sentence "wholly disproportionate to the nature
of the offenses ' ' 1 7 and therefore unconstitutional.
The clear constitutional acceptance of the principle of proportion-
ality should not be mistaken for certainty as to its content. Hard
questions remain to be confronted in determining the factors to be
considered in assessing proportionality'08 and the theoretical con-
164. In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Marshall acknowledged that "Weems is a land-
mark case because it represents the first time that the Court invalidated a penalty pre-
scribed by a legislature for a particular offense. The Court made it plain beyond any
reasonable doubt that excessive punishments were as objectionable as those that were
inherently cruel." 408 U.S. 238, 325 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Powell, al-
though disagreeing as to result, concurred in the acceptance of proportionality as a
concept of constitutional dimensions. Id. at 457 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Other justices who differ in their ultimate views on the death penalty have also em-
braced the proportionality principle established in Weems as a prime component of the
Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., announcing judg-
ment of Court); id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977) (plurality opinion) (capital punishment
for rape "grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment" forbidden by Eighth Amend-
ment).
165. But see Carmona v. Ward, 99 S. Ct. 874, 876-77 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
166. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). The same court
later qualified Hart, and held that the factors considered in that case were not intended
to be "mandatory." Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1231 (4th Cir. 1978) (petition for re-
hearing granted).
167. 483 F.2d at 143.
168. Lower courts have based their analysis on four factors: the nature of the offense,
the legislative purpose in proscribing the prohibited conduct, the penalties authorized for
such an offense in other jurisdictions, and the sanctions imposed for crimes of comparable
severity by the sentencing jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 140-42; Davis v. Zahradnick, 432
F. Supp. 444, 451-53 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226 (4th
Cir. 1978) (petition for rehearing granted). Even these specified considerations do not
identify the standards that a judge should use to determine the "nature" of the offense.
Relevant concerns might include the directness of the harm to others and the degree of
conscious wrongdoing required for conviction, but even these factors fail to assist some
difficult judgments.
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structs by which that assessment should be made. 1609 The likelihood
of such questions, however, does not threaten effective legislative
decisions. Great deference has been accorded to legislative judgments
under every formulation of the proportionality doctrine. Thus, even
under a highly refined approach to proportionality, legislatures would
retain a very broad range of discretion to fix whatever punishment
seemed appropriate. Only in the extreme case of a penalty so "gross-
ly disproportionate and excessive" as to defy rational judgment could
the punishment be found cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. In any event, even if the exact formulation of propor-
tionality concepts remains subject to debate, there is virtue in asking
the right question. For the purpose of the inquiry at hand-and for
the purpose of promoting the constitutional exercise of legislative
power to define crimes-simple acknowledgment of the principle of
proportionality advances the likelihood that the extreme, impermis-
sible cases will be exposed. As the succeeding discussion of illustra-
tive problems attempts to demonstrate, recognition of the appropriate
analytical framework is a long, though not sufficient, step toward
sensible adjudication of the constitutionality of defenses and presump-
tions.
C. Illustrative Problems
Under this substantive reinterpretation of In re Winship, the
constitutional command of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
not be limited to factors formally identified as elements of the offense.
Neither, however, would the reasonable-doubt standard govern every
legislative choice of the factors relevant to criminal liability or ex-
oneration. Instead, the constitutional rule governing certainty of
proof would be linked to a constitutional conception of what must
be proved.
The remainder of this article applies that framework to a series
of illustrative problems. Of course, no general statement leads in-
eluctably to the disposition of every case decided under its authority.
Even within this framework for analysis, disagreement may arise in
the application of principle to discrete situations. The following
examples are not intended to provide irrefutable resolutions of par-
ticular controversies. Rather, they are offered in the hope of expli-
169. For example, some may argue that disproportionality may arise from the stigma-
tizing effect of the label used rather than from the severity of the authorized penalties.
Thus, punishment of merely accidental homicide as "murder" might be viewed as
potentially disproportionate even if the sanctions authorized were less severe than those
normally associated with the crime of that name.
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The first illustration comes from Mullaney and Patterson.170 Both
cases questioned the constitutionality of requiring the accused to
prove provocation in order to reduce murder to manslaughter. The
Maine law considered in Mullaney was unusual in treating murder
and manslaughter as grading categories within a single offense of
felonious homicide, but it maintained the distinction between those
categories in historically familiar terms. Homicide that was other-
wise murder would be reduced to manslaughter if it was done in a
sudden heat of passion based on adequate provocation. Once estab-
lished, this mitigation was said to negate the "malice" required for
liability for murder and thus to leave manslaughter as the most
serious conviction possible for heat-of-passion homicide.17'
Over time, judicial notions of the kinds of affront that might
constitute adequate provocation had become increasingly rigid. 72
New York therefore reformulated the rule so as to avoid the en-
crusted language of the common law. The statute involved in Pat-
terson recognized as a defense to murder the fact that the accused
"acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for
which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse."'' 73 Despite this
broader phrasing, the New York law performed essentially the same
function as the older rule of provocation. It reduced murder to
manslaughter when there was ground "for attributing the intensity
of the actor's passions and his lack of self control on the homicidal
occasion to the extraordinary character of the situation . . . rather
than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own character."' 74 Both
170. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975).
171. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 189 (Me.
1971).
172. See Wechsler & Michael, supra note 35, at 717-23; Williams, Provocation and the
Reasonable Man, 1954 CGam. L. REV. 740, 750. For a comprehensive survey of the common
law development, see R. PERKINS, supra note 91, at 53-69.
173. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975) (murder in second degree); cf. id.§ 125.27(2)(a) (murder in first degree). This formulation derives from a substantially
identical proposal by the American Law Institute. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(I)(b) (P.O.D.
1962). For a discussion of the objectives of this reformulation of the common law rule of
provocation, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment 5 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
174. Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLum. L. REv.
1261, 1281 (1937).
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Maine and New York required that the defendant bear the risk of
nonpersuasion with respect to this category of mitigation.
The Mullaney and Patterson decisions suggest a number of blind
alleys for analyzing the constitutionality of this scheme. First, Maine
tried to attach some importance to the fact that it described murder
and manslaughter as grading categories within the crime of felonious
homicide, rather than as separate offenses.' 75 The Mullaney Court
quite properly rejected this idea. 170 Even under Maine law, substan-
tial differences in punishment and stigma flowed from the classifi-
cation of a homicide as murder or manslaughter. Whatever federal
constitutional guarantees may bear on that determination, their ap-
plicability should not turn on formal characterization by state law.
Otherwise, constitutional mandates would be subject to evasion by
legislative labeling.
The same objection can be made to the Supreme Court's purported
distinction between Mullaney and Patterson. Maine gave the absence
of provocation the name of "malice" and included "malice" in the
definition of murder;177 New York simply recognized extreme emo-
tional disturbances as an affirmative defense to murder.178 Obviously,
this is a distinction without a difference. Both Maine and New York re-
quired that the defendant bear the burden of proving provocation
by a preponderance of the evidence in order to reduce murder to
manslaughter. The constitutionality of that scheme should not de-
pend on the state-law characterization, and any rule so fashioned
could be easily evaded. Finally, as we have argued at length, neither
the Maine nor the New York formulation is constitutionally flawed
simply because it involves a shift in the burden of proof.
In our view, the correct analysis of Mullaney and Patterson turns on
none of these factors. The constitutional focus should be not on what
the state invited the accused to prove by way of mitigation but on
what state law required the government to prove in order to establish
liability in the first instance. Winship should be taken to require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of a constitutionally adequate basis for the
punishment authorized. In both Mullaney and Patterson the maximum
penalty was life imprisonment. The question therefore becomes
whether a sanction of this severity is grossly disproportionate to the
conduct and culpability proved by the state. Absent proof of a constitu-
tionally adequate basis for punishment of this magnitude, provision
175. Brief for Petitioner at 9-11, 16-20.
176. 421 U.S. at 690, 698-99.
177. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2651 (1964).
178. 432 U.S. at 198-99.
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of a burden-shifting defense cannot cure the defect. But if an adequate
basis is proved, its adequacy is not impaired by legislative adoption of
the more generous scheme of an affirmative defense. The issue, in
short, is not whether the state has proved with requisite certainty what-
ever facts it chooses to regard as relevant. The issue, rather, is whether
the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt a just basis for punish-
ment.
Applying this analysis to the problem raised by Mullaney and
Patterson reveals just how straightforward the inquiry can be. The
issue in both cases is whether what the government proved beyond
a reasonable doubt is adequate to sustain a life sentence. Under New
York law, the required showing was clear. The Patterson statute re-
quired proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the actor caused the
death of another and that he did so intentionally. 7 9 Only then would
the affirmative defense of emotional disturbance come into play.
Maine law was less clear, but it seems to have required at least a
showing of reckless homicide. 80 In the Patterson situation, there-
fore, the question is whether life imprisonment may be imposed for
intentional, though provoked, homicide. In Mullaney the required
constitutional judgment is whether a sentence of life imprisonment
is "grossly disproportionate and excessive' u 18 punishment for reckless
homicide. Consideration of that question would be informed by com-
parison with the penalties imposed by Maine and New York for
offenses of comparable gravity and by a survey of the punishments
authorized by other jurisdictions for intentional or reckless homicide
committed in a sudden heat of passion. If under this evaluation, life
imprisonment for heat-of-passion homicide were deemed unconsti-
tutionally excessive, the scheme would not be saved by inviting the
accused to establish mitigation, for Winship would require that a
minimum basis for imposing that punishment be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. If, on the other hand, proof of intentional or
reckless homicide, whether or not provoked, were thought adequate
179. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975).
180. Examination of Maine law makes it clear that the minimum culpability required
for the offense of felonious homicide is recklessness. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 670-72
(Me. 1973) (Wernick, J., concurring). Moreover, this was also the understanding of Maine
law that figured in the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney v. Wilbur:
The Maine law of homicide, as it bears on this case, can be stated succinctly:
Absent justification or excuse, all intentional or criminally reckless killings are
felonious homicides. Felonious homicide is punished as murder-i.e., by life imprison-
ment-unless the defendant proves by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it was
committed in the heat of passion on sudden provocation ....
421 U.S. at 691-92 (emphasis supplied).
181. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 591-92 (1977).
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to support a life sentence, nothing would bar the state from going
beyond the constitutional minimum to allow mitigation when the
defendant can prove his claim to it.
b. Felony Murder
The error in treating the burden of proof as a question divorced
from the substance of the law is further revealed by comparing Mul-
laney and Patterson with the traditional constitutional tolerance of
felony murder.18 2 In both Mullaney and Patterson, the state proved
beyond a reasonable doubt both the act of causing death of another
and the actor's conscious fault with respect to that consequence. Fel-
ony murder imposes similar sanctions without proof of comparable
culpability: the doctrine punishes as murder any homicide committed
during the course of a felony without proof of any mental attitude
with respect to death of another. The homicide, as distinct from
the underlying felony, is a strict liability offense.
It may be generally true that the person found guilty of felony
murder could have been convicted of murder without resort to that
doctrine, 8 3 but in terms of what the prosecution has proved beyond
a reasonable doubt, felony murder raises the prospect that the most
serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental
homicide. Winship requires that the gravity of a crime be evaluated
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and on that basis
the constitutionality of felony murder must be deemed a serious
question.
Consideration of this question suggests alternative lines of analy-
sis. The categorical approach would adhere to the conceptual char-
acterization of felony murder as a strict liability offense. Under this
view, the homicide and the underlying felony would be regarded
as separate and distinct offenses. The underlying felony would be
effectively cancelled out by the punishment authorized for that crime.
The homicide would be dealt with independently, and any additional
penalty would therefore stand or fall on its own basis. Because the
felony-murder rule requires no proof of culpability with respect to
the homicide, it would be condemned as an impermissible imposition
of penal liability without proof of fault. It would therefore be held
unconstitutional, either as an unjustified invasion of that substantive
182. For a general description of the law of felony murder, see W. LAFAVE 9- A. Scorr,
supra note 13, at 545-61; R. PERKINS, supra note 91, at 37-45. For a comment on the
traditional constitutional tolerance of this doctrine, see Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 142.
183. Or, at least, so it appears on the basis of appellate summaries of the evidence.
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liberty guaranteed by the due process clause or as a cruel and unusual
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. This line of analysis
necessarily would condemn every application of the felony-murder
rule, for no matter how heinous the underlying offense, the addi-
tional penalty imposed for homicide would lack any independent
basis in the proved blameworthiness of the accused.
As a statement of normative principle, this categorical assessment
of the felony-murder rule has received an impressive array of schol-
arly support.1 8 4 As a dictate of constitutional law, however, it has
yet to achieve widespread acceptance. The judicial refusal to endorse
this view may be due in part to a certain sense of its unreality. After
all, the violent rapist who kills his victim can hardly be thought
innocent, even though he may be convicted without proof of a homi-
cidal state of mind. Nor is it easy to classify as blameless the armed
robber whose gunshot kills a bystander, just because the prosecution
did not prove culpability with respect to the death.
An alternative way of analyzing felony murder would cast the
homicide as an adjunct of the underlying crime. Under this view,
the felony murder and the underlying felony would be treated as
a package.' s 5 The doctrine could not, therefore, be said to impose
liability without fault, for the prosecution would have to prove the
actor's culpability with respect to the felony. The issue, then, would
not be whether liability had been properly premised on proof of
conduct and culpability. It would be, rather, whether the aggrega-
tion of penalties thus authorized so far exceeded any proved blame-
184. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2, Comment, at 33-89 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959); Packer, Mens Rea, supra note 142.
185. In some jurisdictions felony murder and the underlying felony not only should
but must be regarded as a single package. Under existing double jeopardy doctrine,
separate punishments cannot be imposed for two crimes when proof of all the elements
of one is necessary in order to make out the elements of the other. Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161 (1977); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). Jurisdictions differ as
to whether the underlying felony is regarded as an element of felony murder, or only as
a means of proving the "malice aforethought" which is an element of all murder crimes.
Compare Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) and United States v. Greene, 489 F.2d
1145, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974) and Harvey v. Henderson,
384 F. Supp. 145 (W.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1975) and Newton v. State,
280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977) and State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 36 (Sup. Ct. 1833) and
State v. Woods, 286 N.C. 612, 213 S.E.2d 214 (1975), modified and remanded, 428 U.S. 903
(1976) and State v. Carlson, 5 Wis. 2d 595, 93 N.W.2d 354 (1958) (cases in which underlying
felony is element of felony murder) with Whalen v. United States, 379 A.2d 1152 (D.C.
1977), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3683 (1979) (No. 78-5471) and State v. Adams, 335 So. 2d
801 (Fla. 1976) (per curiam) and State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1058 (1976). At least in those jurisdictions where the underlying felony and
felony murder merge under double jeopardy, the punishment for felony murder becomes
significant only to the extent that it exceeds the maximum permissible punishment for
the underlying felony.
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worthiness of the accused as to constitute grossly disproportionate
and excessive punishment. The constitutional judgment, in other
words, would concern the principle of proportionality rather than
the essential ingredients of crime definition.
This analysis would not condemn every application of the felony-
murder rule. Instead, the question of proportionality would vary
with the nature and gravity of the underlying offense. Thus, pun-
ishment for felony murder might be upheld when the underlying
crime was armed robbery or forcible rape, but disallowed for homi-
cide occurring in the course of some less grievous offense. An ex-
ample of a less grievous offense is the hombook chestnut about the
bartender who commits a statutory felony by selling one drink too
many to an inebriated customer.'80 If the drunk were to fall asleep
on the way home and die of exposure, the traditional felony-murder
doctrine would make the bartender guilty of murder. Yet this would
be patent injustice. Even without categorical disapproval of the fel-
ony-murder doctrine, murder sanctions should be precluded as grossly
disproportionate to any established blameworthiness.
Normatively, the choice between these two lines of analysis is not
free from doubt. The categorical insistence on an independent basis
for punishing the homicide seems conceptually more straightforward
and to that extent more persuasive. Moreover, blanket rejection of
felony murder would not impair effective law enforcement. In the
cases in which the doctrine is actually invoked, the evidence gen-
erally suggests that the prosecution could have proved culpability
with respect to homicide had such proof been required. 187 The prac-
tical consequence of categorically disallowing felony murder would
be to preclude the occasional prosecutorial misuse of an unjusti-
fiably harsh doctrine. Requiring proof of culpability with respect to
death of another would bring the law of homicide into conformity
with the principle implicit in Winship-namely, that criminal pun-
ishment must be based not on that which is likely but only on that
which is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
On the other hand, we find even greater merit in a more selective
reliance on the principle of proportionality. A focus on the aggrega-
tion of punishments for the homicide and the underlying felony
identifies more precisely the extreme case in which the legislative
186. See People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.V. 373 (1924).
187. See note 183 supra. Although the felony-murder rule as applied rarely if ever
results in the conviction for murder of a person who, absent this doctrine, would have
been guilty of no homicide offense, the rule may have a significant impact on the grading
of an offense that otherwise would be manslaughter or negligent homicide.
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authority to define crimes should be curtailed; this approach thus is
more deferential to legislative decisionmaking. Moreover, the pro-
portionality analysis would also bring constitutional doctrine more
nearly into alignment with dominant practice. Although some ver-
sion of the felony-murder rule continues almost everywhere, 88 its
ancient rigor is nowhere in force. Virtually every American juris-
diction, either by statute or decision, has curtailed the doctrine's
sweep. Most commonly, the rule is confined to homicides occurring
during the course of enumerated felonies8 9 or during felonies ge-
nerically described as inherently dangerous to human life. 90 In either
event, the effect is to exclude from the reach of the felony-murder
doctrine most of the egregious situations suggested by the rule's for-
mal statement. It is important to note, however, that although this
kind of limitation reduces the scope of the felony-murder rule, it
does not resolve its essential unfairness. There remains a potential
for gross injustice in the doctrine's application to a particular case.
The proportionality principle stands as an important safeguard against
that possibility.
The point of all this is not to dwell on the merits of felony murder,
but to suggest once again the lack -of congruence between a rigid
procedural insistence on proof beyond a reasonable doubt and any
188. Alone among American jurisdictions, Ohio early abandoned the felony-murder
rule. The common law doctrine was eliminated in the first instance by judicial construc-
tion of a misprinted statute. See Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857). The legislature
subsequently adopted that interpretation. Revised Statutes of Ohio § 6808 (Derby 1879)
(now OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01(B), .02 (Page 1972)). See generally Comment, The
Felony Murder Rule in Ohio, 17 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1956). A close relation of the felony-
murder rule, however, still exists in Ohio under the label of imputed intent. One who
joins with others in the commission of violent crime is presumed to acquiesce in what-
ever reasonably may be viewed as necessary to accomplish the criminal objective. Thus,
under certain circumstances, all participants in an armed robbery may be presumed to
have intended an unplanned but foreseeable killing committed incident to the robbery
attempt. See, e.g., State v. Lockett, 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 358 N.E.2d 1062 (1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
Two additional states in recent years have abolished the felony-murder rule. HA.Ii
REV. STAT. § 707-701 note (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (1975). One state has replaced
the traditional formulation of the doctrine with a rebuttable presumption of the cul-
pability required for murder. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:1-b(I)(b) (Supp. 1973). Finally,
Delaware has substantially qualified the force of the felony-murder rule by a unique
reformulation that effectively reduces the doctrine to a grading device. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 635(a)(2), 636(a)(2) (1974).
Every other American jurisdiction retains the felony-murder rule, although it is gen-
erally subject to qualifications.
189. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (Supp. 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 203
(Supp. 1976); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1101
(1978); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(3) (Vernon 1974).
190. E.g., People v. Philips, 64 Cal. 2d 574, 582-84, 414 P.2d 353, 360-61, 51 Cal. Rptr.
225, 232-33 (1966); People v. Williams, 63 Cal. 2d 452, 457-58, 406 P.2d 647, 649-51, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 9-11 (1965).
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meaningful conception of fairness to the accused. The Mullaney de-
cision found fault with the Maine law of homicide because it allowed
conviction for murder without requiring the state to disprove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the actor killed in a sudden heat of
passion based on adequate provocation. There, at least, the govern-
ment had been required to show the actor's recklessness with respect
to the homicide. If this scheme is constitutionally objectionable, how
much more outrageous is a law that declares the defendant guilty of
murder without proof of any culpability, even negligence, with re-
spect to the risk of taking life?
The ultimate irony is the widespread recent use of burden-shifting
defenses to ameliorate the traditional harshness of the felony-murder
rule. At least eight states have moved to soften this much-criticized
rule by providing as an affirmative defense a showing that death
of another was not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the actor's
conduct."" This roundabout way of requiring negligence with the
burden of proof on the accused may well be inadequate to resolve
the problem of felony murder, but it does represent a step in the
right direction. The purely procedural interpretation of Winship
would reject this device not for substantive inadequacy but for fail-
ure to maintain an empty and pointless procedural regularity. Worse
than being pointless, this kind of reasoning may well force those
legislatures that have adopted ameliorative defenses to reconsider
their position. They could undertake to prove mental culpability
beyond a reasonable doubt and thereby eliminate the felony-murder
doctrine, or they could revert to the traditional posture of unrelieved
strict liability. In light of the continuing legislative acceptance of
felony murder in the face of at least fifty years of sustained academic
and judicial hostility, it is highly unlikely that a constitutional dis-
allowance of legislative compromise would prompt widespread leg-
islative abolition of felony murder. A far more likely result would
be an end to legislative reform and a reversion of the penal law to
an older and harsher rule of liability.
2. Presumptions
As has been noted, Winship implicates the constitutionality of pre-
sumptions as well as that of affirmative defenses. An affirmative de-
fense departs from the reasonable-doubt standard by allowing liability
to be based in part on the defendant's inability to prove exculpation.
191. These jurisdictions include Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Maine, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, and Washington. See Appendix, p. 1401 infra.
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A presumption creates a similar exception to the usual standard of
proof by encouraging one fact to be inferred from another.192 A rigidly
procedural interpretation of Winship would condemn both devices
as unconstitutional evasions of the government's responsibility to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact material to the impo-
sition of penal liability.
Shifting the focus from defenses to presumptions does not resolve
the essential illogic of the procedural interpretation of Winship. The
core problem in either context is the absence of any intelligible jus-
tification, either in constitutional theory or in public policy, for
coercing legislatures to make substantively extreme choices in the
definition and grading of crimes. As applied to presumptions, the
procedural interpretation of Winship would forbid an inference of
one fact from proof of another, even in the face of unquestioned
legislative authority to make the proved fact an independently suf-
ficient basis of liability. In every case in which the constitutional
objection to a presumption hinged on its departure from the rea-
sonable-doubt standard rather than on the substantive inadequacy
of the facts proved, the supposed defect could be cured simply by
making the law more onerous. Thus, for example, forbidding a
presumption of fact X from proof of fact Y would induce the gov-
ernment either to prove X beyond a reasonable doubt or to make Y
an independently sufficient basis of liability. The net effect of the
latter solution would be to withdraw a previously recognized excul-
pation based on the defendant's ability to disprove X.
A rigidly procedural opposition to any departure from the reason-
able-doubt standard would require at least that the presumed fact follow
from the proved fact beyond a reasonable doubt. This formulation
would retain the name "presumption," but rob the device of prac-
tical significance by demanding an inference of such certainty that
no express authorization for it would be needed. To date, no Su-
preme Court decision has unambiguously adopted this position,
though some certainly point in that direction. 193 The test that seems
192. See pp. 1335-37 subra. Our discussion here is directed to the situation in which
state law requires that a presumption instruction be given to the jury, regardless of the
facts of the particular case. Obviously there will be trials in which the evidence supporting
the inference to be drawn will be so persuasive that any additional prompting procured
by the instruction must be regarded as inconsequential. In such cases, the validity of the
presumption will be regarded as irrelevant because whatever error it might embody can
be regarded as harmless. See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Our concern is with presumptions that affect the outcome
of jury verdicts by encouraging the jury to resolve particular issues against a defendant
in spite of the state's failure to provide evidence on the point that is persuasive beyond a
reasonable doubt.
193. See p. 1337 supra.
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to hold sway, as stated in Tot'94 and refined in Leary, 9 5 requires
instead that the presumption be characterized by a "rational connec-
tion" such that "it can at least be said with substantial assurance
that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the
proved fact on which it is made to depend." 196
Although the "rational connection" standard is less demanding
than that which would be suggested by a rigorously procedural in-
terpretation of Winship, the difference is one of degree rather than
of kind. The Tot-Leary approach to the constitutionality of presump-
tions is conceptually consistent with the Mullaney condemnation of
affirmative defenses. Both approaches would focus on procedural for-
mality without reference to substantive impact. Both would disallow
legislative crime definition for reasons not related to the legitimate
scope of legislative authority over the issue in question or to the
government's proof of a constitutionally adequate basis for punish-
ment. Both would force the legislature to the incongruous choice
of proving either more or less, and both would therefore raise the
specter of retrogressive rules of penal liability adopted by reluctant
legislatures in order to comply with a supposedly constitutional com-
mand of fairness to criminal defendants.
Interestingly, although constitutional hostility to presumptions is
consistent with the procedural interpretation of Winship and is often
urged on that basis, it is also defended on grounds quite unrelated
to the concerns of that decision. In the words of Justice Harlan, the
commitment to proof beyond a reasonable doubt is "bottomed on
a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse
to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free."'' 97 We
have dealt at length with the error of treating innocence as an ex-
clusively procedural concept, and that argument need not be re-
peated here. On occasion, however, the constitutional disfavor of
presumptions is explained not as an attempt, albeit misguided, to
protect the innocent, but rather as an incentive to legislative can-
dor. 198 The idea, apparently, is that presumptions, and perhaps even
affirmative defenses, are used to mask the content of the law and
thus to shield harsh legislation from the scrutiny of a concerned
194. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
195. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
196. Id. at 36.
197. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
198. See, e.g., Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 177-78. There have also been
intimations, at least, of reliance on this rationale in some judicial considerations of pre-
sumptions. See, e.g., United States v. Romano, 383 U.S. 136, 144 (1965).
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public.199 The evil at issue in this argument, however, is not the
enactment of substantively unacceptable legislation, for disallowing
presumptions would not prevent that result. Rather, the problem
here envisioned is the rendition of permissible legislative choice in
an impermissibly "disguised form. ' 20 0 The ultimate fear is thus that
the supposed obscurantism of presumptions and affirmative defenses
will inhibit the effective functioning of the political process. 20 1
This line of reasoning is elaborated here not because of any in-
trinsic merit but because of its surprising currency in the secondary
literature. 20 2 In fact, the argument fails on at least two grounds. First,
it begins with a descriptive inaccuracy. There is nothing necessarily
obscure or confusing about the use of presumptions in the definition
of crime. Take, for example, the federal kidnapping statute. It reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 1201. Kidnapping
(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kid-
naps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward
or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by a parent
thereof, when:
(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or for-
eign commerce;
shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or
for life.
(b) With respect to subsection (a)(1), above, the failure to
release the victim within twenty-four hours after he shall have
been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped,
abducted or carried away shall create a rebuttable presumption
that such person has been transported in interstate or foreign
commerce.
2 03
It is hard to discover in this formulation of the crime any scheme
to disguise its content. It punishes kidnapping when there is inter-
state transportation of the kidnapped person, and it allows the trier
of fact to infer such transportation from the actor's failure to re-
lease the victim within twenty-four hours of the kidnapping. To be
199. Even in the case of presumptions, this argument is not well-founded, but to extend
the point to affirmative defenses adds an entirely new dimension of implausibility. See
pp. 1350-51 supra. Even so, some commentators seem to embrace the view that defining a
crime to include an affirmative defense is somehow inherently deceptive and should for
that reason be condemned as unconstitutional. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at
186-87; Underwood, supra note 15, at 1323-25.
200. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 228 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
201. See id.; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 14, at 177-78.
202. See notes 198-201 supra (citing sources).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976).
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sure, one could misconstrue the statute if he read only the first sub-
section. That possibility seems a strange ground for constitutional
complaint, yet it is the only apparent basis for regarding presump-
tions as inherently deceptive. The alleged tendency of a presumption
to mask the substance of the law seems to consist of nothing more
than the fact that it qualifies language appearing elsewhere in the
statute. In other words, a presumption is confusing because it modi-
fies a general statement by subsequent elaboration. There is cer-
tainly nothing unusual in this mode of expression and no apparent
reason to suppose that it creates any special barrier to understand-
ing. It is true that failure to take a presumption into account will
result in an erroneous interpretation based on the unqualified im-
port of other language, but the same is true of any statutory pro-
vision that is not entirely redundant and pointless.
The second problem with the characterization of presumptions
as inherently obfuscatory is the inexplicable selectivity of that accu-
sation. An assertion of constitutional infirmity based on lack of clarity
necessarily implies an assumption of relative clarity elsewhere. That
assumption is patently false. The statute books are full of provisions
that are prolix, inconsistent, and obscure. Moreover, even a statute
seemingly clear on its face may be transformed by judicial construc-
tion to mean something quite different. 20 4 Additionally, there is in-
evitable uncertainty in the reduction of any general rule of liability
to a specific case. Even with the most diligent research, it is sometimes
impossible to resolve uncertainty short of litigation. Finally, everyday
awkwardness in the use of language, the continuing accretion of ju-
dicial gloss, and the irreducible indeterminacy of general statement are
often compounded by legislative resort to the archaic phrasings of the
common law. The not infrequent result is the definition of crime in
terms that, at least to the layman, must be utterly inaccessible. What,
for example, is the uninitiated reader to make of a law that defines
murder as an unlawful killing under circumstances manifesting "an
abandoned and malignant heart?" 20 5 Worse, perhaps, is the statute that
204. A good example is the general federal conspiracy statute. Id. § 371. In addition to
punishing conspiracy to commit any substantive offense, it also proscribes conspiracy "to
defraud the United States." A reasonable reader might well suppose that this language
would reach only conspiracy to cheat the government financially. In fact, the courts have
held repeatedly that no pecuniary loss need be inflicted or contemplated. Instead, the
statute has been interpreted to reach "any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, or
obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government." Haas
v. Henkle, 216 U.S. 462, 478 (1910); accord, Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182,
188 (1924).
205. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West Supp. 1979) defines murder as "the unlawful
killing of a human being. . . with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West
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punishes "murder" without bothering to define it at all.20 6 The con-
demnation of presumptions as devices of deception not only mischar-
acterizes their impact on understanding; it also ignores the prevalence
of opaque and elliptical expression elsewhere in the penal law.
In sum, the notion that presumptions are used to mask the sub-
stance of the law is a flimsy speculation that simply cannot withstand
scrutiny, much less sustain a rule of constitutional adjudication. Even
more implausible is the attempt to generate a similar objection to
the use of affirmative defenses.207 In either case, the argument has
1970) then defines "malice" to exist "when the circumstances attending the killing show
an abandoned and malignant heart." The same phrasing was used in Georgia until that
law was superseded by recent codification. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1004 (1933) (repealed
1968). Other statutes punish murder as "the unlawful killing of another human being
with malice aforethought" without any further elaboration of that critical term. E.g., 18
U.S.C. § 1111 (1976).
206. Perhaps the most notable example of this tradition is 1794 Pennsylvania legisla-
tion that initiated the degree structure for homicide. That statute specified that some
murder would be murder in the first degree and that "all other kinds of murder shall
be deemed murder in the second degree." Nowhere was the crime itself defined. 1794 Pa.
Laws ch. 257, §§ 1, 2. This formulation was copied in a great many American states during
the next century. See Wechsler 9- Michael, supra note 35, at 703-07. The current
Pennsylvania statute has changed the defining characteristics of the degree structure, but
continues to punish the crime of "murder" without statutory definition. 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 2502 (Purdon 1973 & Supp. 1977).
Although death-penalty litigation has resulted in widespread revision of murder
statutes, it remains common in this country to punish "manslaughter" without specifying
the content of that term. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.040 (1970); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
2405 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 387 (1976); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 13 (Michie/
Law. Co-op 1978); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.321 (West 1968); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-
3-25, -47 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1969 & Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 11-23-3
(1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2304 (1974); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-35, -36 (1975); W. VA. CODE
§§ 61-2-4, -5 (1977).
207. See pp. 1350-51 supra. The extension to affirmative defenses of the contention that
presumptions should be disallowed because of their supposed deceptiveness may have
originated from too quick a reading of Ashford and Risinger. See Ashford & Risinger,
supra note 14, at 186-93. Their argument has been sufficiently influential to warrant
rebuttal, but it is also sufficiently circumlocutory to defy easy summary.
Ashford and Risinger begin by rejecting the notion that the constitutionality of a
presumption should depend on the scope of legislative authority to impose the punish-
ment authorized on the basis of the facts proved. Id. at 177-78. They assert that the
greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument is defective in that it fails to take account of
the supposed tendency of legislatures to use presumptions to avoid "the political checks
guaranteed by representative government." Id. at 178. In other words, presumptions are
bad because they are deceptive. In the next section of their article, Ashford and Risinger
proceed to extend their criticism to "assumptions," a term they define to include af-
firmative defenses. Id. at 186-93. The point too easily overlooked is that Ashford and
Risinger do not oppose defenses on the same ground. In fact, they recognize, as any
reasonable person must, that whatever one's opinion of the alleged deceptiveness of
presumptions, there is simply no basis for regarding specification of an affirmative de-
fense as inherently misleading or obfuscatory. Id. at 187.
The trouble is that, having recognized that their asserted reason for rejecting the
greater-power-includes-the-lesser argument in the context of presumptions is in no way
applicable to affirmative defenses, Ashford and Risinger attempt to meet the point with
a flagrantly wrong argument of a different sort. Specifically, they slide into an irrelevant
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the look of a makeweight. It is adduced to support a position based
chiefly on the view that there is something intrinsically wrong with
deviation from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, the
only serious challenge to the constitutionality of burden-shifting de-
fenses and presumptions comes from the procedural interpretation
of Winship and from the conceptually consistent standard of a "ra-
tional connection" between proved and presumed facts.
The following case studies of presumptions illustrate both the ir-
rationality of the "rational connection" test of their constitutionality
and a corollary diversion of judicial attention from the underlying
concerns of substantive fairness. Specifically, the first example de-
picts the silliness to which courts have been led in applying the
Tot-Leary approach, while the second illustrates the resulting inatten-
tion to substantial claims of substantive injustice in the penal law.
a. Presumption of Facts Giving Rise to Federal Jurisdiction
The federal kidnapping statute2 08 punishes kidnapping as a fed-
eral crime whenever any of four jurisdictional bases exists. One such
basis is the fact that the kidnap victim was "willfully transported in
interstate or foreign commerce," and the statute creates a rebuttable
presumption of such transportation from proof of failure to release
the victim within twenty-four hours of the kidnapping. The result
is that kidnapping is a federal crime whenever the actor fails to
release the victim within twenty-four hours unless the defendant can
disprove interstate or foreign transportation.
In United States v. Moore20 9 the Second Circuit held this scheme
unconstitutional. The court began by recognizing the Tot-Leary ap-
proach as controlling the constitutionality of presumptions. 210 The
parade of horribles: "[D]oes it not follow [from allowing affirmative defenses] that 'non-
murder' is a perfectly proper affirmative defense to the crime of possession of a fire-
arm?" Id. at 188. The short answer to this question is "no." Whether the defense is
constitutionally permissible depends on whether the legislature may constitutionally im-
pose murder sanctions for possession of a firearm. That is a question of the scope of
legislative authority over the substance of the law, and its answer one way or the other
does not depend on the general permissibility of affirmative defenses. The evil here envi-
sioned is grossly disproportionate punishment. That problem does not flow from the use
of an affirmative defense; nor would it be prevented by a doctrine disallowing that device.
Rephrased in generic rather than particular terms, Ashford and Risinger essentially ask:
If the greater power (to punish X) includes the lesser power (to punish X unless defendant
can show not-I'), does it not follow that the greater power is without limit? If constitu-
tional procedural protections-and traditional substantive boundaries of the criminal law-
mean anything, the answer is obviously in the negative.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976); see p. 1390 supra (quoting statute).
209. 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978).
210. Tot requires a "rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate
fact presumed." 319 U.S. at 467. Leary adds that such connection will not be found
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Moore court examined the kidnapping statute and found that it
flunked this test: "We simply cannot say with substantial assurance
that for purposes of proving the transportation of a kidnapping vic-
tim in interstate or foreign commerce such transportation is more
likely than not to have occurred whenever the victim is not released
within 24 hours of his disappearance." 211
As an application of settled doctrine, the Moore decision is im-
peccable. In any other frame of reference, it is simply bizarre. The
case involved no colorable claim of unfairness or overreaching. The
investigation proceeded in textbook fashion, and the evidence of
guilt was overwhelming. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendants had committed a kidnapping for ransom. More-
over, there was practical incentive to prosecute for that offense, be-
cause the failure ever to locate the victim's body created an eviden-
tiary obstacle to conviction for murder.
Given these facts, it is more than a little surprising to discover
that the Constitution bars punishment for kidnapping. 12 The rea-
son, we are told, is that the connection between the proved and
presumed facts is insufficiently intimate. The trouble is that there
is no reason for that to matter. The only constitutional issue raised
by this case is the extent of federal authority to punish as a federal
offense any kidnapping in which the victim is not released within
twenty-four hours.213 The critical fact is that the Moore court ef-
fectively found the kidnapping statute beyond the reach of federal
jurisdiction under the commerce clause without devoting to that ques-
tion even a moment's consideration. There is no evidence in the
Moore opinion that the court would have answered the question
the same way if they had thought about it. The reason for this mis-
direction, of course, is that the "rational connection" test of Tot
and Leary makes the scope of legislative authority over the substance
of the law utterly irrelevant to the statute's constitutionality. Instead,
"unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend." 395 U.S. at
36.
211. 571 F.2d at 86-87 (footnote omitted).
212. For reasons not relevant to the instant discussion, the Moore court upheld the
defendants' conviction for conspiracy to commit kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(c)
(1976). Because the defendants had been sentenced to 10 years for the conspiracy offense
and to the statutory maximum of life imprisonment for the substantive offense, the net
effect of the Moore decision was to reduce the defendants' sentences from life to 10
years. See 571 F.2d at 89-90.
213. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See generally Stem, The
Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 271
(1973) (cases permit Congress to regulate local acts, lacking connection with interstate
commerce but difficult to distinguish from acts related to interstate commerce).
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that issue is made to turn on the closeness of an entirely formal
relationship between proved and presumed facts. The result is that
a law is declared unconstitutional for a reason that can most char-
itably be described as aesthetic.
b. Presumptions Based on Presence at an Illegal Still
The traditional approach to presumptions tends not only to exalt
empty formalities but also to divert judicial attention from the un-
derlying claims of substantive injustice. The point is made by com-
paring United States v. Gainey214 with United States v. Romano.215
Both cases arose under the federal statute covering illegal production
of alcoholic beverages. 216 That law defined a number of related of-
fenses, each of which was punishable by a $10,000 fine or five years'
imprisonment or both. Additionally, the statute specified presump-
tions applicable to several of these offenses. These presumptions
allowed the trier of fact to infer a violation of the designated pro-
vision from the defendant's presence at the site of an illegal still or
related activity, "unless the defendant explains such presence to the
satisfaction of the jury."217 In both cases, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of the presumption under the Tot requirement of
a "rational connection" between proved and presumed facts.218 De-
spite these similarities, the Court regarded the cases as "markedly
different. ' 2 19 In Gainey the Court held that presence at a still could
support an inference that the defendant had been engaged in carry-
ing on the business of a distiller without having given the required
bond.22 ° In Romano the Court held that presence at a still could
not support an inference that the defendant had been in possession
of it.221
214. 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
215. 382 U.S. 136 (1965).
216. 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (1970) (amended 1976).
217. Id. § 5601(b)(1), (4).
218. See 382 U.S. at 139; 380 U.S. at 66-67.
219. 382 U.S. at 140.
220. 380 U.S. at 65-68. Specifically, the Court in Gainey upheld the presumption stated
in subsection (b)(2) of the statute:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a)(4) [failure or refusal of a distiller or
rectifier to give bond) the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where,
and at the time when, the business of a distiller or rectifier was so engaged in or
carried on, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or the court when tried without jury).
26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(2) (1970) (amended 1976).
221. 382 U.S. at 138. Specifically, the Court in Romano invalidated the presumption
stated in subsection (b)(1) of the statute:
Whenever on trial for violation of subsection (a)(1) [possession or control of an un-
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Assuming for the sake of argument that one connection may be
thought more "rational" than the other, there is no reason to regard
that as the relevant inquiry. The statute's significance does not lie
in a postulated relationship between proved facts and authorized
punishment. The two provisions imposed identical penalties based
on proof of identical facts. There is no relevant distinction between
them and certainly no theoretical basis for regarding one but not
the other as a valid exercise of legislative power.
In our view, however, the chief objection to Gainey and Romano
is not inconsistency. The difference in outcomes may reflect nothing
more than a developing judicial uncertainty as to what Congress in-
tended.222 The more serious defect is that neither case addresses the
underlying claim of substantive injustice. The critical issue in both
cases is whether the Constitution permits felony conviction to be based
on nothing more than presence at a still. Presence at a still might have
a number of entirely innocent explanations. It might be occasioned by
a hunter's chance encounter, by a farmer's investigation of trespassers,
or by noncriminal association with a bootlegger. It is true that the
statute involved in these cases invited the accused to give such an excul-
patory explanation if he had one. But if Winship means anything, it
surely must stand for the inadequacy of such an opportunity. Criminal
conviction must be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The
only fact proved beyond a reasonable doubt was presence at a still.
The constitutionality of the authorized punishment must be judged
on that basis.223
The reason that this claim was never discussed is not that the
Court is insensitive to considerations of substantive injustice. In-
stead, the problem is that the traditional approach to the constitu-
tionality of presumptions forces substantive fairness into the back-
ground. The search for a "rational connection" implies that the
important issue is formal conformity between proved and presumed
registered still] the defendant is shown to have been at the site or place where and
at the time when, a still or distilling apparatus was set up without having been
registered, such presence of the defendant shall be deemed sufficient evidence to
authorize conviction, unless the defendant explains such presence to the satisfaction
of the jury (or the court when tried without jury).
26 U.S.C. § 5601(b)(1) (1970) (amended 1976).
222. See 382 U.S. at 144 (footnote omitted) ("It may be, of course, that Congress has
the power to make presence at an illegal still a punishable crime, but we find no clear
indication that it intended to so exercise this power.") This explanation for Romano
does not, however, suggest why the identical legislative history did not produce a similar
conclusion in Gainey.
223. Cf. Allen v. County Court of Ulster, 568 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
439 U.S. 815 (1978) (No. 78-1554) (rejecting presumption of possession of gun from gun's
presence in automobile occupied by defendants).
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facts rather than substantive adequacy of an established basis for
punishment. The consequence is a twofold confusion. On the one
hand, the traditional test leads to invalidation of some statutes that
present no colorable case of unfairness or overreaching. The result
is the kind of pointless and unjustified exercise of judicial review
exemplified by the Moore decision. On the other hand, the "ra-
tional connection" approach tends to suggest that some exceedingly
bad laws are constitutionally permissible. Although there can never
be a blanket guarantee against harsh legislation, surely it is appro-
priate to consider whether the government has satisfied minimal con-
ditions of substantive injustice in dealing with the individual accused.
The traditional approach to the constitutionality of presumptions
diverts attention from this inquiry and obscures its significance. The
result, both in the context of presumptions as well as in the proce-
dural approach to affirmative defenses, is a focus on formality rather
than on substance and a corresponding failure to honor the promise
of In re Winship.
Conclusion
The progression from Mullaney to Patterson gives cause for opti-
mism about the evolution of constitutional doctrine governing burden
of proof. In Mullaney the Court confronted an unfamiliar question
in an extremely unusual context. In Patterson the Court revealed
an admirable willingness to reconsider earlier conclusions in light
of subsequent research and reflection. Most importantly, both the
majority and the dissent in Patterson showed a sensitive appreciation
of the potentialities of legislative reform and a determination not
to thwart that process by a rigid and pointless rule of procedural
formality. While it is true that the Court has not yet achieved any
durable resolution of this problem, it is also clear that it has recog-
nized the critical relation between burden of proof and the substantive
law. This article has been an attempt to consolidate that understand-
ing and to point the way toward a more meaningful implementation
of the principle of In re Winship.
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The following chart identifies state statutory provisions that shift the
burden of persuasion to the defendant. Where appropriate, the chart notes
the comparable sections of the Model Penal Code.
An asterisk indicates those sections of the Model Penal Code that shift
















ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-106 to
-108, -110(4) (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
441 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -05-08 (1976)
Aruc. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-206(3) (1977)
ME. 1Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 52(4) (Supp. 1978)
N.H. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 5A:626:3
Il (1974)
L.1978, ch. 95, 1978 NJ. Sess.
Law Serv. 298 (West) (to be codi-
fied at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:
2-4.c(2)) [hereinafter cited to
forthcoming code].
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -05-09 (1976)
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 2, § 8.03(b) (Vernon
1974)
withdrawal ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.16.120(a)(1),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
Anx. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-305(2) (1977)
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 556.056, 562.
041.2(3), .041.3 (1978)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-6.e(3)
(forthcoming West 1979)
















NJ. STAT. ANN., § 2C:2-7.c
(forthcoming West 1979)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 307(d)
(Purdon 1973)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 2, § 7.24(a) (Vernon
1974)



















ALASwA STAT. §§ 11.81.440,
.900(b)(1) (1978)
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-208 (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
431 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
GA. CODE §§ 26-906, -907 (1978)
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 556.056, 562.
071 (1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
40.00 (McKinney 1975)
TEN. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon
1974)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
451, 452 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.81.450, .900
(b)(1) (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-209 (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
432 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
GA. CODE §§ 26-905, -907 (1978)
HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 701-115(2)
(b), 702-237 (1976)
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-12(b)
(forthcoming West 1979)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
40.05 (McKinney 1975)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -05-11 (1976)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313(b)
(Purdon 1973)
all offenses justification GA. CODE §§ 26-901 to -902,
generally -907 (1978)
Mo. RFv. STAT. §§ 556.056, 563.
026.3 (1978)






GA. CODE §§ 26-02 to -904, 907
(1978)
ARx. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-601 (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
401-402 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
KY. REv. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
504.020 (1975 & Supp. 1978)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-3.a
(forthcoming West 1979)
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TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 2, § 8.01(a) (Vernon
1974)
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.12.010
(1977)
attempt renunciation AIASKA STAT. §§ 11.31.100(c), § 5.01(4)
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-704 (1977)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-49(c) (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
541(b) (1974 & Supp. 1978)
GA. CODE § 26-1003 (1978)
HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 705-530(1) (1976)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 154.2.A (Supp. 1978)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5A:629:1
III (1974)
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-1(d)
(forthcoming West 1979)
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 25.00(2),
40.101(3) (McKinney 1975)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -06-05.3a (1976)
On. REv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
.430 (1977)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 4, § 15.04(a) (Vernon
1974)
solicitation renunciation ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.31.110(b)(2), § 5.02(3)
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
Ami'. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-710 (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, §§ 304,
541(a) (1974 & Supp. 1978)
HAWAI REv. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 705-530(2) (1976)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 154.2.B (Supp. 1978)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5A.629:2
II (1974)
N.Y. PENAL L-w §§ 25.00(2),
40.10(4) (McKinney 1975)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01
-03(3), -06-05.3b (1976)
On. REv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
.440 (1977)
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TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 4, § 15.04(b) (Vernon
1974)
conspiracy renunciation Asuc. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-710 (1977)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-48() (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
541(a) (1974 & Supp. 1978)
HAvAII REv. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 705-530(3) (1976)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 144.2.B (Supp. 1978)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-203 (Supp.
1978)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5A:629:3
III (1974)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -06-05.3b (1976)
On. Riv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
.460 (1977)
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,








Auc. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-715 (1977)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.220(b)(d),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)







death un- ALASKA STAT. §§ lA1.115(b),
foreseeable .81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-1502(2) (1977)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-54(c) (1977)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 202.2 (Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
125.25(3)(d) (McKinney 1975)
N.D. C=N. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -16-01.3 (1976)
On. REv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
.115(3) (1977)
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030
(1)(c), .050(l)(b) (1977)





















































CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-54(a)(1), -55(2)(a) (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 303,
641 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.115(d),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-1504(2) (1977)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-1601(2) (1977)
ALASKA STAT. §§ II.41.300(b)(1),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 5, § 20.02(b)(2) (Ver-
non 1974)
WASH. REV. CODE § 9AA0.030(2)
(1977)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.300(d),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 5, § 20.02(b)(2) (Ver-
non 1974)
















CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-192(b) (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
847 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
GA. CODE § 26.1804(c) (1978)
HAWAn REv. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 708-834(4) (1976)
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
509.080 (1975 & Supp. 1978)


































N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
135.75, 155.15(2) (McKinney
1975)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -17-06.2 (1976)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.445(a),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 253.4 (Supp. 1978)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 5, § 21.10(c) (Vernon
1974)
Aruc. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-1802(4) (1977)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-67(a) (1977)
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
510.030 (1975 & Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
130.10 (McKinney 1975)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
163.325(3) (1977)
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.160(1)
(1977)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.445(b),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-1802(3) (1977)
Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
510.030 (1975 & Supp. 1978)
Mi'N. STAT. §§ 609.344(b),
.345(b) (Supp. 1979)
Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 556.056,
566.020.3 (1978)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -20-01(b) (1976)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
163.325(2) (1977)
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102
(Purdon 1975)



















statutory previous CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
rape prolonged -67(b) (1977)
cohabitation ME. REV. STAT. .ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 252.2 (Supp. 1978)
statutory promiscuity HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 701-115


















































Ar.LASKA STAT. §§ 11.46.410(b),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
801(b), 802(b) (1974 & Supp
1978)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-503(2)
(Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
150.05(2) (McKinney 1975)
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.48.060
(1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
811(a)(3) (1974 & Supp. 1978)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-104 (1977)
ALAscA STAT. §§ 11.46.340,
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-110 (1977)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-522 (Supp.
1978)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-134(a)(4) (1977)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
160.15(4) (McKinney 1975)
GA. CODE § 26-1810 (1978)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 361.1 (Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
155.15(1) (McKinney 1975)
Aric. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-2209(9) (1977)
HAw AI REV. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 708-836(3) (1976)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-516(3)
(Supp. 1978)
passing no personal




use of ability to
credit card meet obliga-
tion of owner
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, §§ 304,
902 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
190.15(2) (McKinney 1975)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304, § 224.6
905 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
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18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
4106(b) (Purdon 1975)
Cf. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
17-A, §§ 5(3), 905.2 (Supp. 1978)
(good-faith belief in right to
use); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
25.00(2), 190.15(1) (McKinney
1975) (maker of bad check
can defend if makes full satis-
faction within 10 days after
dishonor by drawee)
deceptive conduct not N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5A: § 224.70
business knowing or 638:6 II (1974)
practices reckless N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-7.g
(forthcoming West 1979)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
190.20 (McKinney 1975)
18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §
4107(b) (Purdon 1975)
bigamy reasonable Apx. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4), § 230.1
belief in -2402(2) (1977)
freedom to CONN. GEN. STAT. 33 53a-12(b),
remarry -190(b) (1977)
GA. CODE §§ 26-2007, -2008
(1978)
NEB. lEv. STAT. § 28-701(1)
(Supp. 1978)
endangering religious N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 25.00(2),
child by belief 260.15 (McKinney 1975)
withholding
medical care
criminal financial TFx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1, See § 230.5 (mis-
nonsupport inability § 2.04, tit. 6, § 25.05(f) (Vernon demeanor if de-
1974) fendant can
provide)
perjury timely ALAsKA STAT. §§ 11.56.235, § 241.1(4)
retraction .81.900(b)(1) (1978)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
1231 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 451.3, 452.2 (Supp. 1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
210.25 (McKinney 1975)
resisting policeman NED. REv. STAT. § 28-904(2)







































ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-2805(2) (1977)
WASH. ryEv. CODE §§ 9A.76.
070(2)(a), .080(2)(a) (1977)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 304,
1247 (1974 & Supp. 1978)
HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 710-1013(2) (1976)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 754.3 (Supp. 1978)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28.301(2)
(Supp. 1978)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 5A:
642:5 III (1974)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
215.45(2) (McKinney 1975)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-01-
03(3), -09-01.3.b (1976)
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.76.
100(2) (1977)
Ky. 1 Ev. STAT. §§ 500.070(3),
520.070(2) (1975 & Supp. 1978)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 17.4 (Supp. 1978)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:29-7
(forthcoming West 1979)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
215.59 (McKinney 1975)
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.76.170
(1977)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§§ 5(3), 510.3 (Supp. 1978)
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-110(4),
-3506(3) (1977)
GA. CODE § 26-2101(e) (1978)
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 25.00(2),
235.15(1) (McKinney 1975)
On. REv. STAT. §§ 161.005(2),
167.095 (1977)
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 9, §§ 43.23(b), .25(b)
(Vernon 1974)
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-12(b),
-19a(c) (1977)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-3e(1)
(forthcoming West 1979)






























































N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-3e(2)
(forthcoming West 1979)
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 10, § 46.06(d) (Vernon
1974)
ALAs1KA STAT. §§ 11.61.200(b),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.61.200(c),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
TFX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 10, § 46.07(c) (Vernon
1974)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.055(2),
167.242 (1977)
ArAsK STAT. §§ 11.66.200(b),
.250, .260(b), .81.900(b)(1) (1978)
HAVAII RiEv. STAT. §§ 701-115
(2)(b), 712-1231(b) (1976)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1112 (Supp.
1978)
TEE. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 1,
§ 2.04, tit. 10, §§ 47.04(b), (c),
.06(c), .07(b) (Vernon 1974)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-1108 (Supp.
1978)
ALASxA STAT. §§ 11.61.150(b),
.81.900(b)(1) (1978)
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